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DE FACTO SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY
JEFF SCHWARTZ ∗
ABSTRACT
For generations, scholars have debated the purpose of
corporations. Should they maximize shareholder value or balance
shareholder interests against the corporation’s broader social and
economic impact? A longstanding and fundamental premise of this
debate is that, ultimately, it is up to corporations to decide. But
this understanding is obsolete. Securities law robs corporations of
this choice. Once corporations go public, the securities laws
effectively require that corporations maximize share price at the
expense of all other goals. This Article will be the first to identify
the profound impact that the securities laws have on the purpose
of public firms—a phenomenon that it calls “de facto shareholder
primacy.”
The Article will make three primary contributions to the
literature. First, it will provide a rich and layered account of de
facto shareholder primacy. The phenomenon is not the result of
considered legislation and regulatory decision. Rather, hedgefund activists leverage the transparency that the securities laws
afford to identify, and force companies to adopt, strategies that
increase share prices. Their activities cast a shadow over the
public market. Because firms must maximize share prices or face
costly, disruptive, and protracted battles with activist hedge funds,
they preemptively focus solely on stock values. The activists’ novel
and opportunistic use of the securities laws has transformed the
regulatory apparatus into a powerful lever of shareholder
primacy. Second, this Article will show how this distortion of the
regulations causes harm. Activist interventions bring the laws into
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conflict with principles of federalism and private ordering, which
hurts entrepreneurs, investors, and equity markets. Finally, to
address these concerns, this Article will recommend that hedge
funds report their holdings in target firms earlier than currently
required. This small change to the securities laws would end
hedge-fund activism and thereby disentangle the securities laws
from corporate purpose.
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INTRODUCTION
Now more than ever, public corporations play an essential role in
society. 1 They have an enormous impact on politics, 2 social issues, 3 the
environment, 4 and the economy. 5 Given their immense footprint, there are
few questions with greater social-welfare implications than whether
corporations exist solely to serve the interests of shareholders (a shareholder
primacy perspective) 6 or whether they have broader responsibilities (a
stakeholder perspective). 7

1. See LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS
FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 86 (2012) (“Corporations . . . control
more resources than many national governments . . . .”); Gabriel Rauterberg, The Corporation’s
Place in Society, 114 MICH. L. REV. 913, 913 (2016) (“The public corporation is usurping the state’s
role as the most important institution of wealthy capitalist societies.”).
2. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission held that corporations can make unlimited
political contributions. See 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010); see also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J.
Jackson, Jr., Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending, 101 GEO. L. REV. 923, 927 (2013)
(presenting evidence that “public companies engage in substantial political spending”).
3. See Tom C.W. Lin, Incorporating Social Activism, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1535, 1535 (2018)
(“Corporations . . . are at the forefront of some of the most contentious and important social issues
of our time.”).
4. See, e.g., S&P GLOBAL, S&P DOW JONES INDICES CARBON EMITTER SCORECARD 3 Ex.1
(2016),
https://us.spindices.com/documents/research/research-carbon-scorecard-april-2016.pdf
(showing that the carbon emissions of the public companies tracked in the S&P 500 Index roughly
equal those of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom combined). See generally Sarah E. Light,
The Law of the Corporation as Environmental Law, 71 STAN. L. REV. 137 (2019) (arguing that
business law should be used as a lever of environmental law).
5. The market capitalization of U.S. public companies is about $32 trillion. See Market
Capitalization of Listed Domestic Companies (United States), WORLD BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD?locations=US&view=chart (last visited
Feb. 12, 2019). U.S. public companies employ about 30 million people, approximately twenty-six
percent of the private sector workforce. See Steven J. Davis et al., Volatility and Dispersion in
Business Growth Rates: Publicly Traded Versus Privately Held Firms 37 tbl. 1 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper Series 12354, 2006), https://www.nber.org/papers/w12354.pdf.
6. The view derives from the canonical article, Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling,
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON.
305 (1976), which casts management as agents for the firm’s shareholders. Id. at 308–09.
7. See Rauterberg, supra note 1, at 914. Sustainability theory is one modern incarnation of
stakeholder theory. See Lynne L. Dallas, Is There Hope for Change? The Evolution of Conceptions
of “Good” Corporate Governance, 54 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 491, 553 (2017) (“[The] sustainability
conception encourages firms to pursue long-term value and focus on the interests of their
stakeholders.”).
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Corporate-law scholars have spent at least ninety years debating these
conflicting views of corporate purpose. 8 This debate swirls today, 9 but
academics, practitioners, and policymakers alike have failed to notice that
securities law—the complex system of federal regulations designed to protect
investors—now has a far greater impact on corporate purpose than corporate
law. This Article will show that, though there is no legal mandate or intent
to do so, the securities laws force public companies to conform to the
shareholder primacy view of corporate purpose. 10 Public companies are
compelled, in fact, to follow a narrow version of this view, which measures
shareholder welfare by stock price despite broad skepticism about this
metric. 11
The mechanism for this de facto shareholder-primacy requirement is
hedge-fund activism. 12 Hedge funds—private and largely unregulated pools
of investment capital—have traditionally made money for their investors
through complex trading, hedging, and derivatives strategies. 13 In recent
years, though, some have adopted a much more aggressive approach.

8. Professor Adolf Berle and Professor Merrick Dodd famously debated the purpose of firms
in the Harvard Law Review in the 1930s. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in
Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1931) (“It is the thesis of this essay that all powers granted to
a corporation or to the management of a corporation . . . are necessarily and at all times exercisable
only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders as their interest appears.”); Adolf A. Berle, Jr.,
For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365, 1365 (1932)
(arguing that “corporations exist for the sole purpose of making profits for their stockholders”); E.
Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1148
(1932) (arguing that the corporation “has a social service as well as a profit-making function”); see
also A. A. Sommer, Jr., Whom Should the Corporation Serve? The Berle-Dodd Debate Revisited
Sixty Years Later, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33, 36–39 (1991) (tracing the history of this debate).
9. Compare Tamara Belinfanti & Lynn Stout, Contested Visions: The Value of Systems
Theory for Corporate Law, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 586–96 (2018) (presenting a model for how to
make management accountable to stakeholders), with Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial:
The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established
by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 793 (2015) (opining
that rather than encouraging firms to act in the interest of stakeholders, “if interests such as the
environment, workers, and consumers are to be protected, then what is required is a revival of
effective externality regulation that gives these interests more effective and timely protection”).
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Section II.E. As I will note in Section I.C., the field of behavioral finance has led
to a great deal of skepticism about the link between share price and long-term shareholder value,
sometimes referred to as “fundamental value.” See also Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 9, at 593
n.70 (“By the close of the twentieth century . . . the idea that stock market prices always capture
fundamental value had been largely abandoned by sophisticated commentators in the face of an
enormous and growing empirical and theoretical literature demonstrating this often was not true.”).
See generally ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL
FINANCE (2000).
12. See infra Section II.F.
13. See David Finstad, Have Institutional Investors Spoiled the Hedge Fund Party?,
INSTITUTIONAL INV. (Oct. 21, 2018), https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b1bh5sbz82rzb
x/Have-Institutional-Investors-Spoiled-the-Hedge-Fund-Party (describing how hedge funds
creatively combine “equities, fixed income, commodities, derivatives, and private investments”).
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Activist hedge funds dissect the copious disclosures required of public
companies. They then purchase stakes in target firms and demand that they
make changes to immediately increase stock prices. Targets overwhelmingly
cooperate. Moreover, because all firms are afraid of becoming targets, they
preemptively take actions to maximize their trading value. The fear of
activist intervention creates a world of de facto shareholder primacy, where
companies are overwhelmingly incentivized to maximize stock prices at the
expense of all else. 14
Etsy’s experience illustrates how the securities laws, as leveraged by
activists, transform the fundamental values of corporations. The company
provides a platform for artisans and small businesses to sell crafts and other
(often quirky) goods to online customers. 15 As a private firm, Etsy was
idealistic and mission-driven. 16 It was a certified B Corp, a status awarded
only to companies that demonstrate a commitment to stakeholders. 17 Etsy
strove to be “a paragon of righteous business practices,” and its “founders
believed its business model—helping mostly female entrepreneurs make a
living online—was inherently just.” 18
When Etsy went public in April 2015, 19 it unwittingly sacrificed these
principles. Etsy’s initial public offering was a success, but its stock price
slumped within a couple of years. 20 A hedge fund, Black-and-White Capital,
saw the slide in stock price as an opportunity. 21 The fund bought a slice of
Etsy and immediately pushed for changes to reverse the decline. 22 The fund
forced the ouster of beloved CEO Chad Dickerson. 23 New leadership then
laid off nearly twenty-five percent of Etsy’s workforce 24 and let the
company’s B Corp certification lapse. 25 The intervention was a victory for
hedge-fund investors. Etsy’s stock price increased twenty-seven percent in

14. See infra Section II.G.
15. See ETSY, https://www.etsy.com/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2019).
16. See David Gelles, Inside the Revolution at Etsy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/25/business/etsy-josh-silverman.html.
17. See id.
18. Id.
19. Max Chafkin & Jing Cao, The Barbarians Are at Etsy’s Hand-Hewn, Responsibly Sourced
Gates, BLOOMBERG (May 18, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-05-18/thebarbarians-are-at-etsy-s-hand-hewn-responsibly-sourced-gates.
20. See id.
21. Id.
22. See id.
23. Gelles, supra note 16.
24. See Caroline O’Donovan, Some Etsy Employees Aren’t Happy About the Company’s More
Corporate Direction, BUZZFEED (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.buzzfeed.com/carolineodonovan/asetsys-new-leadership-celebrates-earnings-some-employees?utm_term=.iaWwyXdmwR#.xwp9jx6
y9O.
25. Gelles, supra note 16.
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the months following the transition. 26 But the company’s founding values
are now gone.
None of this would have happened without securities regulation. As a
public company, Etsy was for the first time required to disclose its operations
and finances. While Black-and-White Capital applied the decisive pressure,
the transparency into Etsy’s business that resulted from its compliance with
the securities laws is what provided the hedge fund with the necessary insight
into the company to transform it from a stakeholder-oriented firm to one
driven by stock prices. Etsy’s conversion shows that only one corporate
purpose can survive the public markets, where hedge funds dig through
securities-law disclosures for hints about how to unearth profits for their
investors.
Activist hedge funds have transformed the securities laws into a
powerful tool of shareholder primacy—and that has serious and unintended
consequences. It is anathema to both corporate and securities law to force
companies to pursue this, or any, particular aim. Instead, corporate law
leaves corporate purpose to the firms themselves. 27 Likewise, a foundational
principle of securities law is noninterference with corporate operations.28
Further still, the corporate-purpose rigidity contravenes principles of
federalism and private ordering, and renders entrepreneurs less innovative,
investors less diversified, and equity markets less stable.29 The response to
all this is to halt hedge-fund activism.
This Article will make three primary contributions to the literature.
First, it will introduce and deeply explore the concept of de facto shareholder
primacy. 30 This will bring an entirely new dimension to the corporatepurpose debate, which has so far been stuck in corporate law. Second,
viewing securities regulation through the lens of de facto shareholder
primacy will provide a fresh way to analyze hedge-fund activism—the socialwelfare consequences of which is one of most hotly debated topics in law and
finance. 31 The new perspective will reveal that the current debate fails to
26. John Mannes, Etsy Lives to Fight Another Day as New Leadership Shaves Costs and
Delivers an Earnings Beat, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 3, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/08/03/etsylives-to-fight-another-day-as-new-leadership-shaves-costs-and-delivers-an-earnings-beat/.
27. See infra Section I.E.
28. See infra notes 288–290 and accompanying text.
29. See infra Section II.I.
30. See infra Part II.
31. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective
on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870,
1871 (2017) (“Few topics are sexier . . . now than whether activist hedge funds are good for, a
danger to, or of no real consequence to public corporations and the people who depend upon them.”).
As it stands, pillars of corporate and securities law stand on opposite sides of the controversy.
Compare Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1643 (2013) (arguing that hedge-fund activism provides useful management
accountability), and Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism:
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appreciate how activism interacts with the securities laws. 32 By situating the
debate in its proper institutional context, this Article will for the first time
show the full scope of the harms that activists cause. Third, this Article will
offer a simple way to eliminate activism that flows from this new, more
complete, understanding. 33
The proposal, which the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)
could implement without congressional involvement, is to reform one of
securities regulations’ many disclosure rules. 34 Currently, investors are
required to report their holdings and material plans for the firm once they
have acquired five percent of a target company’s shares. 35 If investors were
required to report acquisition and intervention plans before they buy any
shares with the intent to influence corporate affairs, then activism would end.
The reporting would lead to increased stock prices in anticipation of the
intervention. 36 Fully informed stock prices would deprive hedge funds of the
ability to buy low from unsuspecting shareholders and sell high when the
market adjusts to their presence. The securities laws would recede from
corporate purpose, giving firms the flexibility that is the hallmark of
corporate law and, in turn, fostering innovation, adding opportunities for
investors, and lending stability to markets.
This Article will proceed in three Parts. Part I briefly will overview the
shareholder primacy and stakeholder theories of corporate purpose and show
Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 867 (2013)
(arguing that hedge-fund activists are important “governance intermediaries”), with John C. Coffee,
Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate
Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545, 592–95 (2016) (arguing that hedge-fund activism raises a host of
concerns and suggesting reform), and Strine, supra note 31, at 1873–74 (arguing that the interests
of activist hedge funds do not align with long-term investors and suggesting reform). One of the
most influential and acerbic critics of hedge-fund activism is Martin Lipton of Wachtell, Lipton,
Rosen & Katz. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Bite the Apple; Poison the Apple; Paralyze the Company;
Wreck the Economy, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 26, 2013),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/02/26/bite-the-apple-poison-the-apple-paralyze-thecompany-wreck-the-economy/ (“[A]ctivists are aided and abetted by Harvard Law School Professor
Lucian Bebchuk who leads a cohort of academics who have embraced the concept of ‘shareholder
democracy’ and close their eyes to the real-world effect of shareholder power, harnessed to activists
seeking a quick profit, on a targeted company and the company’s employees and other
stakeholders.”). The debate is currently mired in dueling empirical studies that ultimately cannot
answer the questions at the heart of the controversy. For reviews of the extensive empirical
literature, see generally Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism: A Review, 4 FOUND. & TRENDS
FIN. 185 (2009); Coffee & Palia, supra, at 581–92; Yvan Allaire & François Dauphin, “Activist”
Hedge Funds: Creators of Lasting Wealth? What do the Empirical Studies Really Say? (July 16,
2014) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2460920.
32. See infra Part III.
33. See infra Section III.C.
34. See infra Section III.C.
35. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l (2011); Form of Schedule 13D, 17
C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (2014).
36. Studies show that the gains from activism occur around when they announce their holdings
and plans. See Coffee & Palia, supra note 31, at 551 & n.14.
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that corporate law (with a focus on Delaware law) is agnostic. Part II will
show how the securities laws, because of the activities of activist hedge
funds, impose de facto shareholder primacy. It will also show that de facto
shareholder primacy runs counter to principles of federalism and private
ordering, and that these conflicts translate to real-world harms. Part III will
reconceptualize the hedge-fund activism debate around whether it is good
public policy to allow hedge funds to use the securities laws to dictate
corporate purpose. This new framework will reveal a strong argument for
curbing their influence. This Part will end with a modest proposal to end
hedge-fund activism and de facto shareholder primacy.
I. THEORIES OF THE FIRM AND CORPORATE PURPOSE
The competing theories of corporate purpose are based on competing
positive theories on the nature of the firm (i.e., theories about what firms are).
Shareholder primacy theory is based on a “nexus-of-contracts” view 37 and
stakeholder theory is generally based on an “entity” view. 38 These theories
about what firms are translate into normative views about how they should
act—the heart of the corporate-purpose debate. 39
A. “Nexus of Contracts” and Shareholder Primacy
The nexus-of-contracts view is the foundation of an elegant model of
firm behavior and corporate purpose. Professors Jensen and Meckling
popularized this theory in their famous article, Theory of the Firm. 40
According to Jensen and Meckling’s theory, a firm “is a set of contracts
among customers, suppliers, investors, managers, employees, and thirdparties . . . with the legal fiction of the corporation serving as the central node
through which all of these contractual relationships are mediated.” 41 This
nexus of contracts “is also characterized by the existence of divisible residual
claims on the assets and cash flows of the organization, which can generally
be sold without permission of the other contracting individuals.” 42
These residual claimants are shareholders. Because they own the
residual, which is a variable claim dependent on how the firm is run,
Professors Jensen and Meckling view management as the shareholders’

37. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 6, at 311.
38. See Joseph L. Bower & Lynn S. Paine, The Error at the Heart of Corporate Leadership,
95 HARV. BUS. REV. 50, 57–59 (2017).
39. This Section only scratches the surface of the corporate-purpose debate. For more
comprehensive treatments, see Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 9, at 586–96; Henry Hansmann &
Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 440–49 (2001).
40. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
41. Thomas S. Ulen, The Coasean Firm in Law and Economics, 18 J. CORP. L. 301, 320 (1993).
42. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 6, at 311.
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agents, duty-bound to maximize their wealth. 43 To the extent they fail to
wholeheartedly devote themselves to this goal, management imposes
“agency costs” on shareholders. 44 The role of corporate law under this view
of the firm is to police these agency costs. 45 Implicit in all of this is a theory
of corporate purpose and how the law relates to it: a corporation’s purpose is
to serve shareholders, in particular, to maximize their wealth, and corporate
law is there to police obedience to this purpose.
What makes this account—the shareholder primacy view—particularly
appealing is its link to the efficient market hypothesis (“EMH”). Under
EMH, stock prices reliably reflect the value of firm equity. 46 Thus,
management’s performance can be measured by a single, instantly
accessible, figure—the firm’s stock price—a second-by-second appraisal of
shareholder well-being. Management is thus guided by a simple heuristic:
maximize share price. 47
Professors Jensen and Meckling present their view of the firm as a
positive theory, but like all positive theories, it carries normative
implications. In line with Professors Jensen and Meckling’s view, Milton
Friedman famously argued that “the social responsibility of business is to
increase its profits.” 48 The logic behind this claim is that, since shareholders
are residual claimants, and all other contractual counterparties to the firm
have fixed claims, the way to maximize total value is to maximize the value
of the residual. 49
The foregoing is the orthodox law-and-economics account of the firm—
it is a nexus of contracts overseen by the firm’s executives, who have a duty
to maximize shareholder wealth as measured by share price. 50
Economists and legal scholars have hotly debated these ideas. As a
positive matter, critics raise a number of problems with this characterization
of the firm. Some of the most prominent critiques include the following:

43. Id.
44. STOUT, supra note 1, at 18–19.
45. D. Gordon Smith, Corporate Governance and Managerial Incompetence: Lessons from
Kmart, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1037, 1059 (1996) (“Under the contractarian model, the purpose of the
corporate governance system is the minimization of agency costs.”).
46. See Jeff Schwartz, Fairness, Utility and Market Risk, 89 OR. L. REV. 175, 201–02 (2010).
47. See Theresa A. Gabaldon, The Story of Pinocchio: Now I’m a Real Boy, 45 B.C. L. REV.
829, 848 (2004) (describing stock price as “the modern surrogate for shareholder primacy”).
48. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32.
49. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA.
L. REV. 247, 263 (1999).
50. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 39, at 447. There is also a less strident version of
this theory in which management has a duty only to shareholders, but their interests stretch beyond
wealth maximization to things like clean air and fair employment practices. See STOUT, supra note
1, at 90. This version turns shareholder primacy into a type of stakeholder theory, where broader
shareholder values, in principle, dictate how the firm balances stakeholder interests.
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Because firms can hold property, they are more than a mere contractual
node; 51 because shareholders lack the requisite control, the relationship
between shareholders and management is not truly one of “agency” as
defined by law; 52 because shareholders have discordant interests, most
notably between short- and long-term holders, the command to serve
shareholders is incoherent; 53 and because others are affected by the firm’s
decisions, shareholders are not the only holders of variable claims. 54 To flesh
out the final argument, bondholders, for instance, have interests that in many
ways conflict with those of shareholders. 55 One example is that a firm might
increase its debt load. This action might improve shareholder returns, but it
reduces the value of outstanding bonds. 56 Thus, shareholder-friendly actions
can constitute wealth transfers from other stakeholders.
The positive critiques of the accuracy of Professor Jensen and
Meckling’s model bleed into normative ones based on both efficiency and
distributional (i.e., fairness) concerns. Most importantly, if the shareholders
are not the only ones impacted by management’s actions, then it does not
follow that corporate leadership should act solely on their behalf. In this case,
the firm may generate more total value by balancing the competing claims,
which would provide incentives for other stakeholders to make long-term
investments in the firm’s success. 57
The distributional argument focuses on the externalities generated from
a focus on shareholders. 58 For instance, under a shareholder primacy view,
a firm has the incentive to pollute the waterways of local communities if it
would generate shareholder value. This might be inefficient if the
community’s needs are weighed in the cost-benefits equation. But even if
stockholders gain more than the community loses (a net benefit calculation
consistent with Kaldor-Hicks efficiency 59), one could reasonably argue that
this distribution of resources—from those unfortunate enough to live

51. See Blair & Stout, supra note 49, at 278.
52. Id. at 290–91.
53. See Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 661 (2006).
54. Lynn A. Stout, The Toxic Side Effects of Shareholder Primacy, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 2003,
2014 (2013).
55. See Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV.
1907, 1928 (2013) (“[I]t is now clear that increasing the alignment of managers and shareholders
can have a significant effect on bondholders.”).
56. Stout, supra note 54, at 2011.
57. Blair & Stout, supra note 49, at 315.
58. Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 9, at 592.
59. According to this measure, a change is efficient if total welfare is increased even if some
parties’ share is reduced. See MARK SEIDENFELD, MICROECONOMIC PREDICATES TO LAW AND
ECONOMICS 49 (1996).
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downstream from a polluter to those with money to invest in the offending
enterprise—is unfair. 60
B. “Entity” Theory and Stakeholder Theory
Those who reject the nexus-of-contracts view and, among other things,
its implications for corporate purpose, argue that the corporate entity is more
than a contracting convenience. Although there are many theories that seek
to reify the firm, the one that is the best foil to the nexus-of-contracts—and
in my view, has the most appeal—is sometimes referred to as entity theory. 61
According to this view, the firm is an artificial person and the owner of its
own residual. 62 “Equity,” after all, appears on the corporation’s balance
sheet. And the firm has discretion over what to do with it. Most tellingly,
the decision whether to pay out dividends from retained earnings (a portion
of firm equity) belongs to management. The shareholders lack any say over
when and whether they receive distributions. Under the entity view, the
firm’s goal is not necessarily to maximize shareholder wealth.63
Management may balance competing interests to the extent it deems fit—
acting on behalf of the entity within legal bounds. 64
Entity theory thus opens the door to stakeholders. 65 Who constitutes a
stakeholder is the subject of debate, 66 but one commonly used (and broad)
definition is that the term stakeholder encompasses “any group or individual
who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s
objectives.” 67 Under this definition, employees, consumers, suppliers, and
owners are commonly listed, as well as an oblique reference to something
like “broader society.” 68
These groups include those who make some investment in the firm,
broadly construed. 69 Shareholders invest money. Employees invest human
capital. Members of society invest through taxes, which go to fund
60. See Wai Shun Wilson Leung, The Inadequacy of Shareholder Primacy, 30 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 587, 605–09 (1997).
61. See Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 9, at 586–87; Bower & Paine, supra note 38, at 60;
Dodd, supra note 8, at 1146.
62. Stout, supra note 54, at 2013.
63. See Bower & Paine, supra note 38, at 60 (stating that the function of corporations under
entity theory is to “[p]rovide goods and services; provide employment; create opportunities for
investment; drive innovation”).
64. See Dodd, supra note 8, at 1159–63.
65. Not all who reject shareholder primacy, embrace entity theory. See Blair & Stout, supra
note 49, at 254 (arguing for a stakeholder-oriented model from a nexus-of-contracts perspective).
66. See Eric W. Orts & Alan Strudler, The Ethical and Environmental Limits of Stakeholder
Theory, 12 BUS. ETHICS Q. 215, 215 (2002).
67. R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH 46
(2010).
68. Orts & Strudler, supra note 66, at 218.
69. See id.
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infrastructure on which corporations depend. In addition, by granting
corporations limited liability, society has made an implicit bargain with
corporate shareholders. 70 While this may benefit society on the whole,
everyone bears a small cost for this exchange and has thereby made an
investment in these enterprises. Another way to picture stakeholders is in
terms of externalities. 71 For instance, those who live in a valley downwind
of a company’s emissions are stakeholders because they are “affected by” the
firm, namely the negative externalities of its actions.
The normative arguments for stakeholder theory are the corollary to the
efficiency and distributional critiques to shareholder primacy noted above.
Briefly, it is argued that it would be more efficient to balance stakeholder
interests because doing so would encourage stakeholder engagement, and
firms with strong stakeholder support maximize total value over the longterm. 72 Moreover, it would be fairer to balance such interests because it
would avoid the concentration of wealth in shareholders to the detriment of,
for example, employees and community members. 73 Consistent with these
arguments, under the leading theory of business ethics, managers are
encouraged to maximize a “triple bottom line”—profits, people, and planet. 74
Like shareholder primacy, stakeholder theory has endured decades of
critique. The most important revolves around accountability. Critics argue
that allowing managers to balance stakeholder interests in whatever manner
they please is an invitation to abuse. Accountability to everyone equates to
accountability to no one. The promised efficiency and fairness gains,
therefore, may be overrated or even chimerical.75

70. See Stefan J. Padfield, Corporate Social Responsibility & Concession Theory, 6 WM. &
MARY BUS. L. REV. 1, 23 (2015).
71. See James A. Stieb, Assessing Freeman’s Stakeholder Theory, 87 J. BUS. ETHICS 401, 407
(2009).
72. Blair & Stout, supra note 49, at 292; Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization and
Stakeholder Theory, HARV. BUS. SCH.: WORKING KNOWLEDGE (July 24, 2001),
http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/value-maximization-and-stakeholder-theory (“[I]f we tell all participants
in an organization that its sole purpose is to maximize value, we would not get maximum value for
the organization.”).
73. See Thomas Donaldson & Lee E. Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation:
Concepts, Evidence, and Implications, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 65, 80–81 (1995).
(Nov.
17,
2009),
74. See
Triple
Bottom
Line,
ECONOMIST
https://www.economist.com/news/2009/11/17/triple-bottom-line; see also Rauterberg, supra note
1, at 914 (“In business ethics, the leading view is that corporate managers should balance the
interests of all the constituencies affected by a firm’s actions, including employees, suppliers,
consumers, owners, and the broader society (‘stakeholder theory’).”).
75. See Stephen Bainbridge, A Duty to Shareholder Value, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/04/16/what-are-corporations-obligations-toshareholders/a-duty-to-shareholder-value. For the stakeholder theory response, see KENT
GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE
POSSIBILITIES 231–33 (2006); Dallas, supra note 7, at 559 (arguing that decisionmakers can be held
accountable to multiple constituencies).
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C. Shareholder Primacy Reimagined—Long-Term Shareholder Value
and Efficient Markets
The idea that firms should pursue long-term shareholder value is a
version of shareholder primacy that highlights the role of stakeholders in the
calculus. 76 Proponents of this view point out that shareholder primacy means
a commitment to maximizing the fundamental value of the firm 77 (i.e., the
discounted present value of the shareholders’ future cash flows 78). The way
to maximize this figure likely means looking out for the long-term prospects
of the firm, which includes considering the interests of stakeholders. 79 Over
time, the most valuable firms are likely the ones that are good to their
employees and the community. 80
While long-term wealth maximization may be the most influential
version of shareholder primacy, 81 largely because it has been endorsed by the
Delaware courts, 82 the introduction of this concept has done little to quell
debate. In putting shareholders first, it fails to convincingly address the
efficiency and distributional critiques levied earlier. It may not always be
most efficient to prioritize shareholders in balancing competing stakeholder
concerns (for instance, group welfare may be enhanced by privileging
employee interests). 83 With respect to fairness, shareholders may never

76. See Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Short- and Long-Term Investors (and Other
Stakeholders Too): Must (and Do) Their Interests Conflict?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 396, 398 (Claire A. Hill & Steven Davidoff Solomon eds. 2016).
77. See Cliff Asness, Shareholder Value Is Undervalued, AQR INSIGHTS (Jan. 6, 2015),
https://www.aqr.com/Insights/Perspectives/Shareholder-Value-Is-Undervalued#_ftn2.
78. See Jeff Schwartz, The Law and Economics of Scaled Equity Market Regulation, 39 J.
CORP. L. 347, 363 (2014).
79. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 38 (1991) (“[M]aximizing profits for equity investors assists the other
‘constituencies’ automatically. . . . A successful firm provides jobs for workers and goods and
services for consumers. The more appealing the goods to consumers, the more profit (and jobs).
Prosperity for stockholders, workers, and communities goes hand in glove with better products for
consumers.”).
80. See Asness, supra note 77 (opining that companies maximize shareholder value by “having
some combination of great products, perhaps a mission that is truly beneficial to the world, satisfied
customers or clients, and a team of employees that is motivated to deliver”); Belinfanti & Stout,
supra note 9, at 619–20 (“[E]xecutives who publicly espouse shareholder value as their ultimate
objective . . . still emphasize that the best way to achieve that objective is not to focus directly on
trying to ‘maximize’ profits or share price, but instead to pay close attention to the company’s sales
trends, employee morale, customer satisfaction, supply chain, and reinvestment initiatives.”).
81. See Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 9, at 589; Jensen, supra note 72; Strine, supra note 9,
at 768.
82. See infra Section I.E.
83. See Bower & Paine, supra note 38, at 58 (“Agency theory’s implied decision rule—that
managers should always maximize value for shareholders—oversimplifies this challenge and leads
eventually to systematic underinvestment in other important relationships.”); Lynn A. Stout, Bad
and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1198 (2002)
(“[S]hareholder primacy easily can produce results that are inefficient . . . the ideal rule of corporate
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internalize the cost to certain non-shareholders, like affected communities,
especially if they are not local residents. 84
Moreover, whether the long-term shareholder value view is truly an
innovation depends on the validity of EMH. If stock prices are efficient, then
this view is merely a restatement of the traditional law-and-economics
version. Since the price would reflect its long-term prospects, any gain would
reveal an increase in the long-term value of the firm. 85 Only in an inefficient
market would share prices deviate from long-term value. If this is the case,
then long-term value theory has significantly different implications than the
original—managers should maximize long-term value rather than current
stock prices.
Whether share prices reflect long-term or short-term value is
particularly important. The distinction not only determines whether the
emphasis on long-term value is a unique strain of shareholder primacy. As
further discussed in Part II, whether share prices reflect long-term value is
also essential to the debate about the consequences of hedge-fund activism. 86
There are a number of things that companies can do—and that hedge funds
push—that have short-term benefits but long-term costs. Squeezing more out
of current employees might increase firm value in the short term, but in the
long-term disaffected workers are likely to quit. The cost of hiring and
training new personnel then eats into future profits. Cuts to research and
development (“R&D”) save money now, but over time a company loses its
competitive edge. Companies can decrease the quality of their products to
save costs. But eventually customers will switch. Professor Stout uses the
imagery of fishing with dynamite. 87 It might a produce a record catch, but
the long-term welfare of the fishing company is destroyed. 88
In an efficient market, stock prices would accurately reflect the shortterm/long-term tradeoff. 89 A company that starts making inferior goods
would see a stock decline. If stock prices can deviate significantly from longterm value, however, then such moves could result in a stock-price bump.
Despite the increase in stock prices, actions where short-term benefits are

governance, at least from an efficiency perspective, is to require corporate directors to maximize
the sum of all the risk-adjusted returns enjoyed by all of the groups that participate in firms.”).
84. See Strine, supra note 9, at 786–87 (arguing that “externality regulation is important,
because the profit-pressure put on corporations by institutional investors is strong”).
85. See Jonathan R. Macey, Market for Corporate Control, LIBR. OF ECON. & LIBERTY,
https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/MarketforCorporateControl.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2019)
(“Share prices reflect the present value of future returns to shareholders and are, therefore, a measure
of the long run. Successful corporate strategies, even those that are not expected to produce positive
returns for years, will generate immediate increases in share prices.”).
86. See infra notes 221–235 and accompanying text.
87. STOUT, supra note 1, at 51.
88. Id.
89. See Macey, supra note 85.
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outweighed by future costs would be inconsistent with long-term value
theory.
Research in behavioral finance suggests that, despite long-term
consequences, short-term actions can increase stock prices. Prices that reflect
future prospects are the result of efficient markets. Efficiency requires
arbitrage trading—informed buying and selling behavior that corrects
mispricings. 90 The central insight of behavioral finance is that arbitrage is
inherently risky and expensive, and that stock prices deviate from
fundamental value to the extent of these costs. 91 The prediction of inaccurate
stock prices is backed by a mountain of empirical evidence.92
One particularly relevant reason why short-term moves can cause a
deviation has to do with the structure of institutional investing. For the shortterm and long-term to align, sophisticated institutions need to buy, sell, or
short-sell stocks that are mispriced in the hopes that they will return to
fundamental value in the future. Estimating the fundamental value of a
security in the long-term, though, is costly and uncertain. 93 The future is
inherently unknowable. And stock prices only return to fundamental value
if others in the market eventually agree with a prescient analyst’s assessment.
But broader market awareness of a long-term mispricing may take a long
time. In a competitive institutional marketplace, where money managers are
judged on short-term results, analysts may lose their jobs before their bet pays
off. 94
Because of the inherent uncertainty of long-term valuation and the risk
of investor flight before the market catches up, picking stocks based on
fundamental value is generally a bad way to make money. That being the
case, few do it. A recent study showed that eighty-five percent of analysts
use metrics that are only loosely related to fundamental analysis to assess
companies. 95 The use of the price-earnings ratio, for example, is common. 96
Valuation is based simply on comparing this figure to other like companies.
90. Technically, a stock’s price reflects the value at which parties are willing to transact. An
adjustment to the expectations about the value of a particular stock, therefore, is sufficient to change
its price. The gains from arbitrage trading, however, are what drive parties to adjust their
expectations.
91. Schwartz, supra note 46, at 204–21.
92. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 291 (2014) (“‘Overwhelming
empirical evidence’ now suggests that even when markets do incorporate public information, they
often fail to do so accurately.” (quoting Baruch Lev & Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and
10b–5 Damages: A Legal, Economic and Policy Analysis, 47 STAN. L. REV. 7, 20–21 (1994)));
Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 9, at 593 n.70.
93. See Alfred Rappaport, The Economics of Short-Term Performance Obsession, 61 FIN.
ANALYST J. 65, 65 (2005).
94. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can
Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think
Long Term, 66 BUS. L. 1, 12 (2010).
95. See Rappaport, supra note 93, at 68 n.8.
96. See id. at 68.
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There is no calculation of discounted cash flows. If much of the smart money
is ignoring long-term valuation, then there is a significant chance that today’s
prices are far off from the correct value. 97
In light of the behavioral finance critique of efficient markets, the most
plausible view is that share prices largely reflect short-term valuations with
some anchor to fundamental value. If the distance between short-term values
and real value becomes too far off, this opens up an arbitrage opportunity
despite the costs and risks. But the distance is unknown and potentially
wide. 98 This means that steps that improve the short-term prospects of a
company, even if they reduce its long-term value, have the potential to
increase stock prices—even over an extended period.
The challenges to market efficiency mean that long-term value theory is
more than a restatement of the orthodox approach, where share price equates
to value. In fact, in light of these challenges, defenders of the orthodox
approach must either fall back to long-term value theory or argue that
managers should still maximize stock prices even though the link to
fundamental value is unknown (and unknowable). The former runs into
accountability problems similar to those faced by stakeholder theory. 99
Almost any action can be framed as in the interests of long-term value, and
stock prices are an unreliable lodestar. 100
The latter view that managers should maximize stock prices regardless
of their accuracy could be defended on the grounds that maximizing stock
prices literally maximizes shareholder value. But this stance is normatively
problematic. It amounts to an instruction to management to sacrifice the
future in favor of the present if it means a higher stock price. Acting like this,
however, destabilizes markets and hinders innovation. 101 It is a path to
nowhere. In a search of the literature, I could not find anyone who endorsed
the view that short-termism regardless of future consequences was a
promising corporate purpose. As argued in Part II, however, this warped
view of shareholder primacy is the one that the securities laws force on public
firms.

97. See id.
98. See William W. Bratton, Supersize Pay, Incentive Compensation, and the Volatile
Shareholder Interest in PERSPECTIVES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 150, 159 (F. Scott Kieff &
Troy A. Paredes eds. 2010) (“Under the present consensus view, the stock market is a place where
noisy supply and demand intermix with fundamental value because there is not enough smart money
to trump the dumb money in the short term.”).
99. See Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 9, at 585.
100. See id. at 598.
101. See infra Section I.E.

668

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 79:652

D. An Unsettled Debate
Over time, managers have embraced disparate views of corporate
purpose. In the United States, waves of shareholder primacy thinking and
stakeholderism rise and fall. 102 After World War II until the 1970s, managers
saw themselves as stewards for the firm and its constituents. 103 The 1980s
saw the rise of shareholder primacy. 104 And these swings do not necessarily
align with attitudes in other countries. Continental Europe, for instance, is
known for a stakeholder orientation. 105 The variation means that there is no
intrinsic “corporate purpose”; rather notions of corporate purpose are driven
by norms and law.
What the norms or laws should be is also uncertain. From an efficiency
perspective, the question is which corporate purpose maximizes social
welfare. It might maximize welfare for management to favor long-term
shareholder interests, let contractual counterparties fend for themselves, and
lean on regulators to address negative externalities. 106 On the other hand, this
may put too much faith in private ordering and regulatory capacity. The
result might be stakeholder underinvestment and diffuse economic, social,
and environmental harms. From a fairness perspective, the question is which
corporate purpose leads to a more equitable distribution of resources. Again,
there are two plausible outcomes. It may be better for management to have
a single-minded shareholder focus and for society to handle distributional
questions through tax policy or other social interventions. 107 It could also be
the case, however, that social redistribution and other programs are too blunt,
and that management is better situated to decide how to equitably handle
competing interests related to the business. 108 And there would still be room
for broader social redistribution to address imbalances.
Since there are no clear answers, this may be something that is best left
to entrepreneurs to decide for themselves. 109 If corporate purpose is left to
private ordering, each corporation could choose what to maximize and how
to split the surplus it creates among its constituents. Ultimately, while there

102. See Dallas, supra note 7, at 497–530; Rock, supra note 55, at 1912–13.
103. Dallas, supra note 7, at 506–07.
104. See id. at 508.
(Apr.
22,
2010),
105. A
New
Idolatry,
ECONOMIST
https://www.economist.com/business/2010/04/22/a-new-idolatry; Dallas, supra note 7, at 558.
106. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 579 (2003); Rock, supra note 55, at 1930; Strine, supra note
9, at 792–93.
107. See Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial
Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2070 (2001).
108. See Robert A. Phillips & Joel Reichart, The Environment as Stakeholder? A FairnessBased Approach, 23 J. BUS. ETHICS 185, 187 (2000) (explaining that “the managerial challenge is
to find a middle ground between the interests of the legitimate stakeholders”).
109. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 79, at 36.
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has been a long-standing and heated debate about corporate purpose,
corporate law takes this final approach.
E. Corporate Law and Theories of Corporate Purpose
State corporate law governs the internal affairs of corporations.110 It
sets out the default organizational structure of firms and the fiduciary duties
of management. 111 Entrepreneurs choose in which state to incorporate partly
based on these rules, and Delaware is far and away the most popular. 112 The
default rule in Delaware requires that management adhere to the long-term
value theory of shareholder primacy; it also gives shareholders legal and
voting rights that theoretically allow them to police conformity. Despite this
framework, however, management has a great deal of discretion to run firms
as they please. Delaware corporations can easily opt out of the default
structure; other states provide additional flexibility. The result is a cafeteriastyle menu of corporate-purpose options for private companies. 113
Delaware law clearly does not mandate a particular purpose. A
company’s Certificate of Incorporation can specify that the corporation takes
stakeholder interests into account. 114 Whether the law imposes shareholder
primacy as the default has long been debated, but the Delaware Supreme
Court’s decision in eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark 115 seems to
put any doubts to rest. In the case, the founders of Craigslist said that they
were more interested in serving the community that made use of its online
marketplace than in generating shareholder value.116 The court disapproved:
Having chosen a for-profit corporate form, the craigslist directors
are bound by the fiduciary duties and standards that accompany
that form. Those standards include acting to promote the value of
the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders. . . . Thus, I
cannot accept as valid . . . a corporate policy that specifically,
clearly, and admittedly seeks not to maximize the economic value
of a for-profit Delaware corporation for the benefit of its
stockholders . . . . 117
110. See Richard M. Buxbaum, The Threatened Constitutionalization of the Internal Affairs
Doctrine, 75 CAL. L. REV. 29, 32 (1987).
111. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 79, at 15, 90–91.
112. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.
L. & ECON. 383, 391 tbl.2 (2003) (stating 57.75% of firms incorporate in Delaware; California, the
next most common, claims 4.33%).
113. Because entrepreneurs have such a range of options, it is plausible to assume that, in many
cases, the choice to incorporate as a for-profit Delaware corporation amounts to an acceptance of
the long-term value theory of shareholder primacy. This does not, however, amount to an
acceptance of de facto shareholder primacy, which equates good management with stock value.
114. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(1) (2018).
115. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010).
116. See id. at 8.
117. Id. at 34.
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Though the language seems fairly straightforward and strict, Delaware
law is not as demanding as it first appears. Delaware judges have repeatedly
emphasized their commitment to “long-term shareholder value.” 118 And any
stakeholder-oriented action can be defended on such grounds. 119 Let us say
management would like to give employees a raise. Shareholders might
rightfully complain that this money comes out of their pockets, but
management can respond that the added compensation is important for
employee retention. Since almost any decision can be similarly justified, the
command to privilege shareholders is all-but toothless.
This is particularly true given the legal standard that is applied to such
challenges. The law affords extraordinary deference to management under
the business judgment rule—the legal standard for adjudicating allegations
of unintentional mismanagement. 120 If management provides any plausible
shareholder-related defense of its actions, it will withstand scrutiny. 121
Justice Strine, the then-Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court,
conceded the point in an otherwise fiery article excoriating those who
question Delaware law’s commitment to shareholder primacy:
Of course, it is true that the business judgment rule provides
directors with wide discretion, and thus enables directors to
justify—by reference to long-run stockholder interests—a number
of decisions that may in fact be motivated more by a concern for a
charity the CEO cares about, the community in which the corporate
headquarters is located, or once in a while, even the company’s
ordinary workers, rather than long-run stockholder wealth. But
that does not alter the reality of what the law is . . . . [I]f a fiduciary
admits that he is treating an interest other than stockholder wealth
as an end in itself, rather than an instrument to stockholder wealth,
he is committing a breach of fiduciary duty. 122
The key word in that lengthy quote is that shareholder primacy only
applies if management admits favoritism toward other stakeholders. Thus,
so long as management defends its conduct through empty statements about
shareholder value, its decisions are protected. 123 This leaves little of the
corporate-law obligation to pursue shareholder primacy.
Although shareholders could turn to their voting rights to police
management’s conformity to long-term value maximization, this avenue is

118. See Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 9, at 595–96 (emphasis omitted).
119. See STOUT, supra note 1, at 32.
120. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
121. See Strine, supra note 9, at 776–77.
122. Id. (emphasis added).
123. According to Justice Strine, “My point, however, is not whether the law permits directors
to engage in pretext, it is what the law allows them to do expressly and forthrightly.” Id. at 783
n.84.
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also of limited practical value. 124 In theory, if shareholders think that board
members are favoring other interests, they could vote them out of office.
Officers would soon follow. But the prospects for such upheaval are thin, at
least for private companies. 125 Since there are no explicit disclosure
obligations under corporate law, shareholders lack the information to take
such actions. 126
The only sources of disclosure are the duties of care and loyalty, which
mandate informed shareholder consent for fundamental changes or to cure
conflicts of interest, or when a director is selling to a shareholder while
“possessed of special knowledge of future plans or secret resources and
deliberately misleads a stockholder who is ignorant of them.” 127 The
Delaware corporate code also allows shareholders to demand information
under section 220. 128 Shareholders must justify any demand by reference to
a “proper purpose.” 129 The bar is generally low for this request, and can be
satisfied by a claim that a shareholder wishes to value her shares.130 While
this right is undoubtedly of some use, managers often resist and can hold up
requests in litigation. 131 The information is also confidential and cannot be
shared with other shareholders. 132 While section 220 may provide a
shareholder with information on which to base a breach of fiduciary duty
claim or sell shares, the inability to spread the information renders it
unsuitable for launching a largescale campaign to unseat management.
In the end, because the law supports only long-term shareholder value
theory, because conformity is measured by the lax business judgment rule,
and because shareholders lack the information to make meaningful use of
their voting rights, the legal commitment to shareholder primacy is of limited
real-world import. While the law creates, or at the very least reinforces, the

124. See Bainbridge, supra note 106, at 569.
125. Although shareholders could negotiate for more powerful information rights and voting
power in the private sphere, the default structure leaves them ill-positioned to challenge
management. See id. at 569–72.
126. See Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance:
Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 867 (2003) (noting that corporate law imposes
few disclosure obligations).
127. Lank v. Steiner, 224 A.2d 242, 244 (Del. 1966).
128. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (2018).
129. Id.
130. See La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc., No. 5682-VCL, 2011
WL 773316, at *6 (Del. Ch. Mar. 4, 2011).
131. See Rolfe Winkler, Startup Employees Invoke Obscure Law to Open up Books, WALL ST.
J. (May 24, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/startup-employees-invoke-obscure-law-to-openup-books-1464082202.
132. Confidentiality is frequently imposed by the Delaware courts. See, e.g., Disney v. Walt
Disney Co., 857 A.2d 444, 448 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“[I]t is often the case that the Court of Chancery
will condition its judgment in Section 220 cases on the entry of a reasonable confidentiality order
‘to prevent the dissemination of confidential business information to “curiosity seekers.”’”).
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shareholder primacy norm, a legal obligation that can be so easily abjured is
rather weak. 133
And entrepreneurs can completely opt out if they wish. Entrepreneurs
can choose to form Delaware benefit corporations (an option created by the
Delaware legislature in August 2013). 134 Such public benefit corporations
promise to balance stakeholder interests. 135 Thus, just within Delaware, there
are a range of corporate-purpose options. If founders find none of these
setups appealing, they can opt to incorporate in a different state, with still
other choices, including constituency statutes. Under these statutes,
corporations explicitly have the right to take stakeholder interests into
account. 136 Despite a longstanding and thoughtful debate about corporate
purpose in Delaware law, all states, including Delaware, leave the decision
to private ordering.
The result is that entrepreneurs, and the private companies they found,
can largely do as they please with respect to corporate purpose. This
approach makes sense in light of the uncertainty in the corporate-purpose
debate. 137 But once a company goes public, everything changes. In imposing
de facto shareholder primacy, the securities laws undermine this longstanding
framework. For public companies, the flexibility and discretion afforded
under corporate law disappears.
II. DE FACTO SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY AND THE SECURITIES LAWS
Despite impassioned debate about the corporate-purpose demands of
Delaware law, the legal structure is ultimately deferential. Securities law is
the opposite. The rules say nothing about corporate purpose, and nobody
talks about it. But in practice, as a consequence of hedge-fund activism, the
rules today effectively require conformity to the shareholder primacy norm.
This Section traces how this happened. The potential for de facto shareholder
primacy is embedded in the structure of the securities laws, but it laid
dormant until shifting securities markets gave rise to hedge-fund activism.

133. This account overlaps with a description of corporate law called “director primacy.”
Bainbridge, supra note 106, at 550. According to this view, the directors run corporations. Id. In
that role, they are obligated to serve shareholders. See id. Shareholders, however, have little ability
to police whether directors do so. See id. at 569. This Article, parts ways with director primacy in
a number of respects. Most importantly, director primacy claims to describe the governance of
public corporations; this Article argues that, in this context, shareholders are now in control.
134. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362 (Supp. 2018).
135. Id. § 365(a) (“The board of directors shall manage or direct the business and affairs of the
public benefit corporation in a manner that balances the pecuniary interests of the stockholders, the
best interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the specific public
benefit or public benefits identified in its certificate of incorporation.”).
136. Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 16 (1992); see, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. § 717(b) (McKinney 1989).
137. See supra Section I.D.
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A. The Basic Structure of Securities Regulation
The securities laws are famously intricate, but the overarching structure
is straightforward. The centerpiece is disclosure, which is required of all
public companies. 138 When companies go public, they register with the SEC,
which involves filing a registration statement, consisting mainly of a sales
document (the “prospectus”) that typically stretches for hundreds of pages. 139
Once the SEC approves the registration statement, the company can sell
shares to the public, and it becomes subject to periodic reporting
obligations. 140 These obligations include filing quarterly and annual reports,
as well as brief disclosures when specified material events warrant. 141 The
centerpiece of securities-law disclosures, both in the prospectus and later
filings, are financial statements 142 and management’s discussion thereof (socalled “MD&A”). 143
Public companies must also have policies and procedures in place to
mitigate the risk of misstatements in these documents (so-called “internal
controls”). 144 The internal controls that relate to financial reporting must be
audited by an independent accounting firm. 145
Rules also touch directly on corporate governance and shareholder
rights. Federal law mandates that companies have independent audit
committees. 146 The New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) and Nasdaq
listing requirements require that public companies have majority independent
boards, and that they have wholly independent compensation and nominating
committees. 147 While the listing requirements are technically part of stock
market rules, they are functionally part of securities regulation. 148
Shareholder voting is federally regulated through the proxy rules. 149
These require that public companies provide shareholders with disclosures to
inform their voting with respect to board membership and any other matters

138. Schwartz, supra note 46, at 181.
139. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.404 (2019).
140. See id. § 240.13a-13, 240.15d-1.
141. See id. § 240.13a-13.
142. See id. § 210.3-01 to 210.3-20.
143. See id. § 229.303.
144. See 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 229.308.
145. 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01.
146. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1.
147. See NASDAQ, THE NASDAQ STOCK MARKET LLC RULES 5605 (2020),
http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQ/Main/; NYSE, NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL
§ 303A.01, 303A.04–303A.07, https://nyseguide.srorules.com/listed-company-manual.
148. See Jonathan R. Macey, The Politicization of American Corporate Governance, 1 VA. L.
& BUS. REV. 10, 37 (2006) (“[T]he available evidence indicates that the organized exchanges do
not even act as stand-alone regulators anymore. Instead, they are better understood as conduits for
the SEC . . . .”).
149. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2.

674

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 79:652

upon which their consent is sought. 150 In addition, these rules dictate
procedures that parties must follow when soliciting shareholder votes 151 and
that public companies must include shareholder proposals in the companies’
proxy-solicitation materials, provided certain conditions are met. 152 Beyond
all of this, public companies must now also provide shareholders with a “sayon-pay”—an advisory vote on executive compensation. 153
Going public, however, is the exception. Firms can stay private in a
number of ways, most importantly by selling shares only to financially
sophisticated individuals or institutions. 154 Sophistication is almost always
determined by a financial proxy—the accredited investor standard, which
essentially deems parties sophisticated if they meet certain wealth or income
thresholds. 155
Regardless of whether a company is public or private, its behavior is
subject to securities-fraud regulations. 156 Liability attaches to material
misstatements made in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. 157
The SEC, the Justice Department, and private parties can bring suit.158 If
filings are false or misleading, a public company may be found liable for
securities fraud even if the corporation or its management was not actively
trading. 159 Insider trading (i.e., trading while in possession “of material
nonpublic information”) is also a considered a form of securities fraud. 160
The securities laws thus consist of a blanket anti-fraud prohibition that
applies to all companies, and significant disclosure and operational
requirements for firms that go public. The well-accepted overarching
justification for securities regulation is “investor protection.” 161 Though the
public disclosures were designed to enable investors to make informed
purchase and sale decisions, few believe that individual investors actually
read them. 162 Rather, the current theory is that information contained in the
disclosures is baked into stock prices. 163 This is because sophisticated
investors, analysts and the financial press read them; informed traders buy,
150. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n.
151. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3.
152. See id. § 240.14a-8.
153. See id. § 240.14a-21.
154. See, e.g., id. § 230.506.
155. See id. § 230.501.
156. Id. § 240.10b-5.
157. See id.
158. Veronica M. Dougherty, A [Dis]semblance of Privity: Criticizing the Contemporaneous
Trader Requirement in Insider Trading, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 83, 85 (1999).
159. Urska Velikonja, The Cost of Securities Fraud, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1887, 1908
(2013).
160. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(a).
161. See Schwartz, supra note 46, at 181.
162. Id. at 183.
163. Id. at 184.
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sell, or adjust their reservation prices based on their analyses; and prices
adjust in reaction. 164
B. Securities Law’s Expansive Potential
The securities laws always contained the seeds of de facto shareholder
primacy. While the primary aim of the securities laws may be investor
protection, the primary contribution is broader—comprehensive and credible
information about public companies that is available to everyone. Once in
the public domain, the potential uses of the disclosures are limitless.
Investors can use the information to help decide whether to purchase or sell
securities, but anyone can use what they read for anything.
Central to this Article is that credible comprehensive disclosures allow
shareholders to police whether managers are looking out for shareholder
interests. Most important are the financial statements. While they provide
the information on earnings, growth, and risk that is essential for financial
analysis of a potential investment, these same three metrics are also important
to shareholders. If earnings or growth appear stalled, shareholders can put
pressure on managers to change how they operate. In theory, shareholders
could even wage a proxy contest if management’s response is unsatisfying.
This potential to use securities disclosures for monitoring corporate
executives is an intrinsic part of the regulations.
Until recently, however, shareholders did not use the transparency
afforded to them to intervene in firm affairs. A number of barriers stood in
the way. These have all eroded, however, and while retail investors (i.e.,
nonprofessional individual investors) are still essentially powerless, hedge
funds now leverage the securities laws to police management and promote
their agenda.
C. The Shifting Equity Market Landscape
The changes to equity markets that set the stage for hedge-fund activism
and de facto shareholder primacy took place in the last few decades. The
most important shift has been from retail to institutional shareholders. 165
Retail investors lack the time and skill to parse securities disclosures
and intervene in firm affairs. And they have little incentive to do so. Even
with the tools the securities laws provide, shareholders face a tremendous
collective action problem. They bear all of the costs of monitoring
management and effecting change but share the benefits with other

164. See id. at 181–86; Merritt B. Fox, Required Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 62 L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 113, 117–18 (1999).
165. See Brian G. Cartwright, General Counsel, U.S. SEC, The Future of Securities Regulation
(Oct. 24, 2007), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch102407bgc.htm (describing the
growth in institutional ownership and its implications).
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shareholders and perhaps even other stakeholders. It is, therefore, rational to
stay out of firm governance and sell if prospects look bleak. 166 The idea that
shareholders are rationally apathetic with respect to voting in public
companies dominated thinking in this area for almost a century. 167 The ease
of selling juxtaposed against the cost and difficulty of intervention168 meant
that securities disclosures were tools for investing rather than tools of
management oversight.
The calculus, however, has changed. At the inception of the securities
laws, equities were almost universally owned by retail investors. 169 While
their ownership share has declined precipitously over time, 170—the paradigm
shift came with the rise of mutual funds in the 1980s and 1990s. 171 These
funds pool money from individuals and invest it in different types of
securities, mainly stocks and bonds. Their assets now total nearly $20
trillion. 172 They, along with other institutions, now dominate the stock
market, owning more than seventy percent of public-company shares. 173 And
this figure understates the extent to which mutual funds and other institutions
have come to dominate. They do almost all of the public-market trading. 174
Moreover, individuals are less likely to vote their shares in director elections:
In 2019, individuals voted twenty-eight percent of their shares while
institutions voted ninety. 175 Thus, both trading and voting activity is heavily
institutional.
Even as they amassed large holdings, institutions tended to stay out of
firm affairs. The response to poor management was to sell. 176 But a series
of developments has disrupted their passivity, making them a receptive
audience for hedge funds seeking support for their activist campaigns.
Department of Labor (“DOL”) and SEC rule changes in the last few
decades pushed for increased institutional involvement. In the 1980s, the
166. See Bainbridge, supra note 106, at 558.
167. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 47–65 (rev. ed. 1940) (providing the canonical work on oversight problems in
public firms caused by dispersed ownership).
168. See Nickolay Gantchev, The Costs of Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Sequential
Decision Model, 107 J. FIN. ECON. 610, 623 tbl.7A (2013) (estimating the cost of a proxy contest
waged by a hedge-fund activist to be $10.8 million).
169. See Luigi Zingales, The Future of Securities Regulation, 47 J. ACCT. RES. 391, 401 (2009).
170. See id. at 402 fig.1.
171. See Cartwright, supra note 165.
172. See INV. CO. INST., 2018 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 58 (58th ed. 2018).
173. Zingales, supra note 169, at 392; see also JAMES R. COPLAND & MARGARET M. O’KEEFE,
PROXY
MONITOR
2017:
SEASON
REVIEW
(2017),
http://www.proxymonitor.org/Forms/pmr_15.aspx (noting the influence of large institutional
investors on the success of shareholder proposals in 2017).
174. Zingales, supra note 169, at 392.
PULSE,
2019
PROXY
SEASON
REVIEW
5
(2019),
175. PROXY
https://www.broadridge.com/_assets/pdf/broadridge-proxypulse-2019-review.pdf.
176. Coffee & Palia, supra note 31, at 553.
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DOL explicitly stated that responsible proxy voting was part of a pensionfund manager’s fiduciary obligations. 177 In 2003, the SEC changed its rules
to “require advisers to adopt and implement policies and procedures for
voting proxies in the best interest of clients, to describe the procedures to
clients, and to tell clients how they may obtain information about how the
adviser has actually voted their proxies.” 178
The changes caused institutions to start paying attention to proxy voting.
They also fueled the rise of proxy advisory firms, which allow for partial
outsourcing of oversight responsibilities and an associated cost savings. 179
Through the use of proxy advisory services, mutual funds can participate in
corporate governance, and meet their legal obligations, without a significant
financial drain. 180
There have also been major shifts within the mutual-fund industry.
Index fund investing has boomed in recent years. 181 Unlike active fund
managers, index funds cannot sell whenever they please. Because they are
required to track a particular index, the only way to improve returns is to take
an active role. 182
The industry has also become more concentrated. On average, fortyfive percent of an S&P 500 company’s stock is held by its ten largest
institutional investors. 183 Taken together, three mutual-fund complexes—
Vanguard, State Street, and BlackRock—are the largest shareholder in ninety
percent of S&P 500 firms. 184

177. The statement first came in an interpretive letter. See Letter from Alan D. Lebowitz,
Deputy Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, to Helmuth Fandl, Chairman of the Ret. Bd., Avon
Prods., Inc. (Feb. 23, 1988), reprinted in Pens. Rpt. (BNA) Vol. 15, No. 9 at 391 (Feb 29, 1988).
The obligation is now codified as 29 C.F.R. § 2509.08-2 (2016).
178. Proxy Voting by Investment Advisors, 68 Fed. Reg. 6585, 6586 (Feb. 7, 2003).
179. See Coffee & Palia, supra note 31, at 557.
180. See id. at 557–59; see also James R. Copland et al., The Big Thumb on the Scale: An
Overview of the Proxy Advisory Industry 2 (May 30, 2018) (unpublished Research Paper No. 1827,
Stanford
Univ.
Graduate
Sch.
of
Bus.),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3188174 (providing an overview of the proxy
advisory industry).
181. See Trevor Hunnicutt, Index Funds to Surpass Active Fund Assets in U.S. by 2024:
Moody’s, REUTERS (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-funds-passive/index-fundsto-surpass-active-fund-assets-in-u-s-by-2024-moodys-idUSKBN15H1PN;
Ryan
Vlastelica,
Passive Funds Aren’t Afraid to Throw Their Weight Around as Activists, MARKETWATCH (May 1,
2017),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/passive-funds-arent-afraid-to-throw-their-weightaround-as-activists-2017-05-01.
182. See Jill Fisch et al., The New Titans of Wallstreet: A Theoretical Framework for Passive
Investors, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 17 (2020).
183. David Benoit & Kirsten Grind, Activist Investors’ Secret Ally: Big Mutual Funds, WALL
ST. J. (Aug. 9, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/activist-investors-secret-ally-big-mutual-funds1439173910.
184. See Jan Fichtner et al., These Three Firms Own Corporate America, The CONVERSATION
(May 10, 2017), http://theconversation.com/these-three-firms-own-corporate-america-77072.
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These mutual-fund complexes are not activists. But hedge-fund
activism would be impossible without their concentrated ownership and
engagement. 185 An activist’s threat is only credible if there is widespread
shareholder support. It would be extraordinarily costly and likely fruitless to
lobby millions of uninformed retail investors, but it is cheap and productive
to make the case to a limited group of sophisticated institutions that have a
legal obligation to listen.
Institutions also aided activists through their involvement in the
shareholder proposal process. They backed, and in some cases pushed for,
changes that have shifted power to shareholders. Shareholder proposals tend
to cluster into three categories: corporate governance reforms that increase
shareholder power, executive compensation, and social policy. 186 While
shareholder proposals can be made by shareholders with only minimal
holdings 187—and in fact are commonly made by individuals (so-called
“gadflies”) 188—it is institutional support that gives them teeth. Their votes
ultimately determine what gets implemented. While proposals with little
support have little influence, those with majority support frequently become
company policy. 189
The institutional vote has tended to back shareholder-empowering
proposals and those that address executive compensation, while rejecting
proposals with a social aim. 190 The support for shareholder-friendly
proposals has led to a spate of corporate governance changes, such as proxy
access, declassified boards, simple majority voting, and separation of the
CEO and Chairman-of-the-Board positions. 191 Without getting into detail,
these changes loosen management’s control over boards and foster
shareholder involvement in director nomination and selection. Although this
was not what institutions had in mind in lending their support, the shift in the
balance of power toward shareholders eased the path for activism, a hallmark
of which is confrontation with incumbent boards.
Finally, as the barriers to activism declined, the hedge-fund industry has
also matured. In the 1980s and 1990s hedge funds prospered with novel

185. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 31, at 863, 886; Strine, supra note 31, at 1898–99 (“Without
the support of . . . mainstream funds, the activist hedge fund leader would not have the clout to
extract favorable concessions in a settlement, much less to prevail in a contested proxy fight.”).
186. See COPLAND & O’KEEFE, supra note 173, at 5–6.
187. See 17 C.F.R 240.14a-8 (2007) (requiring holdings of $2000 in market value).
188. See COPLAND & O’KEEFE, supra note 173, at 4.
189. See Luc Renneboog & Peter G. Szilagyi, The Role of Shareholder Proposals in Corporate
Governance, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 167, 167 (2011).
190. John Roe, Shareholder Proposals: Evidence of Private Ordering Supplanting Public
Policy?, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 19, 2017),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/06/19/shareholder-proposals-evidence-of-private-orderingsupplanting-public-policy/.
191. COPLAND & O’KEEFE, supra note 173.
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arbitrage strategies. 192 But the low-hanging fruit has been picked and the
fund marketplace has become crowded. 193 With more pliable boards and
concentrated ownership, active engagement with companies became a newly
promising way to make money for their investors.
D. The Strategy of Hedge-Fund Activists
Against this backdrop, activist hedge funds have proliferated. Their
strategy is straightforward. The funds first research companies and select
their target. 194 They then purchase a portion of the company’s stock,
typically around six to eight percent. 195 Funds also join together in so-called
“wolf packs.” In this case, a group of funds invest in a target before the lead
fund’s intervention is publicly disclosed. 196 Next, hedge funds pressure
management for change and lobby institutional investors to support their
position. 197 If management does not immediately concede, the fund publicly
criticizes firm leadership, and if that does not work, they wage a proxy contest
to gain board seats and push their agenda. 198
Institutional investors frequently support activist campaigns. While
they do not always get along, proxy advisory firms and mutual funds have
shown themselves often to be receptive to the activists’ proposals.199 There
192. See David Finstad, Have Institutional Investors Spoiled the Hedge Fund Party,
INV.
(Oct.
21,
2018),
INSTITUTIONAL
https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b1bh5sbz82rzbx/Have-Institutional-InvestorsSpoiled-the-Hedge-Fund-Party.
193. See id.
194. See Damien J. Park, Activist Investors and Target Identification, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
&
FIN.
REG.
(June
23,
2016),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/06/23/activist-investors-and-target-identification/;
Bill
George & Jay W. Lorsch, How to Outsmart Activist Investors, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 2014),
https://hbr.org/2014/05/how-to-outsmart-activist-investors.
195. See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Pre-Disclosure Accumulations by Activist Investors:
Evidence and Policy, 39 J. CORP. L. 1, 4–5 (2013) (finding a median ownership interest of 6.3%);
C.N.V. Krishnan, Frank Partnoy & Randall S. Thomas, The Second Wave of Hedge Fund Activism:
The Importance of Reputation, Clout, and Expertise, 40 J. CORP. FIN. 296, 300 (2016) (finding
median ownership of 8.3%).
196. Martin Lipton, Dealing with Activist Hedge Funds and Other Activist Investors, HARV. L.
SCH.
F.
ON
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
&
FIN.
REG.
(Jan.
26,
2017),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/26/dealing-with-activist-hedge-funds-and-other-activistinvestors/.
197. Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV.
561, 583 (2006); Yvan Allaire, Hedge Fund Activism: Preliminary Results and Some New Empirical
Evidence, INST. FOR GOVERNANCE OF PRIV. & PUB. ORGANIZATIONS 17 (Apr. 1, 2015),
http://www.shareholderforum.com/access/Library/20150401_Allaire.pdf
198. Anabtawi, supra note 197, at 583.
199. Coffee & Palia, supra note 31, at 568 (“Although [proxy adviser] recommendations do not
invariably favor the insurgents, they do support the insurgents much of the time.”); Assaf Hamdani
& Sharon Hannes, The Future of Shareholder Activism, 99 B.U. L. REV. 971, 978–79 (2019); Strine,
supra note 31, at 1898 (describing mutual-fund support of activists); Allaire, supra note 197, at 42
(describing “strong support” from institutional investors).
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is also anecdotal evidence that mutual funds nudge activists towards certain
engagements. 200
Activist interventions fall into roughly four categories. The first
involves challenges to the governance of the target firm. They might seek to
change the structure of corporate governance or the makeup of
management. 201 For example, funds might push to increase board
independence or remove the CEO. 202 The second involves demands to
distribute corporate cash to shareholders. Along these lines, funds will
commonly demand dividend payments or stock buy-backs (even if
companies must borrow to raise the necessary funds). 203 Third, activists call
for corporate reorganizations. They argue that the target should be sold 204 or
that it should spin-off a division or substantial assets. 205 Finally, activists
look for ways to reduce costs. They might advocate cuts to executive
compensation, 206 R&D, or staff. 207 Hedge funds have also pushed for ways
to reduce the targets’ taxes, including inversions. 208
Companies initially resist,209 but they frequently concede to activist
demands. In the great majority of cases they enact the activist’s agenda in
whole or in part. 210 Usually companies accede as part of a privately
negotiated settlement in which hedge funds also receive board seats. 211 If
companies are unwilling to settle, and a proxy contest ensues, hedge funds
win sixty percent of the time. 212

200. See Che Odom, Long-Term Investors Increasingly Hiding Behind Activists, BLOOMBERG
BNA (March 16, 2016); Strine, supra note 31, at 1898 & n.97.
201. Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance,
63 J. FIN. 1729, 1742 (2008).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. (showing that almost five percent of activists target executive compensation).
207. Allaire, supra note 197, at 22–24 (showing significant declines in the number of employees
and the amount spent on R&D); Roger L. Martin, Activist Hedge Funds Aren’t Good for Companies
or Investors, So Why Do They Exist?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 20, 2018),
https://hbr.org/2018/08/activist-hedge-funds-arent-good-for-companies-or-investors-so-why-dothey-exist.
208. Strine, supra note 9, at 789–90.
209. Brav et al., supra note 201, at 1746 (“[T]arget companies choose to . . . resist [hedge fund
intervention] 41.3% of the time.”).
210. See Allaire, supra note 197, at 18 (finding 75.7% of hedge funds partially or completely
achieved their stated goals); Alon Brav et al., The Returns to Hedge Fund Activism 6 (European
Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 098, 2008) (“Overall, hedge fund activism achieves
full or partial success in roughly two-thirds of events.”).
211. See Kai Haakon Liekefett, The Hypocrisy of Hedge Fund Activists, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 4, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/06/04/thehypocrisy-of-hedge-fund-activists/.
212. April Klein & Emanuel Zur, Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and
Other Private Investors, 64 J. FIN. 187, 188–89 (2009).
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E. De Facto Shareholder Primacy
Activist interventions, and the larger shadow they cast, are forcing firms
to adopt the myopic view of shareholder primacy, where shareholder welfare
is judged by share price regardless of its link to fundamental value. 213 The
changes to board governance that hedge funds advance build on previous
efforts by institutions and others to reduce managements’ influence over
boards. Hedge funds present these more sympathetic boards with proposals
to increase stock prices.
Increasing stock prices is, and always is, their goal. 214 They pursue it
regardless of the impact on stakeholders and long-term shareholders. Which
is no surprise. It is, after all, what their own investors demand. Even though
hedge funds have no interest in corporate purpose per se, because their
actions focus solely on immediate stock-price gains irrespective of other
interests, their actions, when viewed in such terms, compel companies to
pursue a version of shareholder primacy that ignores long-term
consequences.
Activists’ record in generating stock-price gains is mixed. On the
whole, hedge-fund activists cause stock-price improvements. 215 But not all
interventions are equally profitable. Sale of the target reliably generates
strong returns, but other interventions are less fruitful. 216 Some generate
gains; others losses. 217 Just as in stock picking, there are better and worse
activist investors. 218
Those interventions that do generate above-market gains must do so by
transferring wealth to short-term shareholders from stakeholders and longterm shareholders, increasing the intrinsic value of the firm, or through some
combination of the above. Although an exact apportionment among these
potential contributors is impossible, wealth transfers appear to play the
dominant role.
All of the substantive changes discussed above move value from
stakeholders to shareholders. Selling the target immediately boosts its stock
price. 219 But it does so, at least partly, at the expense of employees. Although
explanations for this bump vary, these transactions almost always lead to
layoffs as redundancies are eliminated.220 When money is returned to
213. See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text.
214. See Strine, supra note 31, at 1892 (“[A]ctivist hedge funds identify companies and take an
equity position in them only when they have identified a way to change the corporation’s operations
in a manner that the hedge fund believes will cause its stock price to rise.”).
215. See Coffee & Palia, supra note 31, at 583 (“Most studies have found that target firms of
activist hedge funds earn on average positive abnormal returns in the event window . . . .”).
216. See Allaire, supra note 197, at 34, 42; Strine, supra note 31, at 1944.
217. See Coffee & Palia, supra note 31, at 584–85.
218. See Krishnan, et al., supra note 195, at 296.
219. Strine, supra note 31, at 1944.
220. See id. at 1945.
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shareholders through stock buybacks and dividends, it hurts bondholders and
lenders because it decreases their capital cushion. Cuts to R&D hurt
consumers, who are deprived of innovative products. Tax inversions and tax
evasions (even if lawful) shift the burden of funding the government to other
taxpayers and reduce government resources.
There are rare cases where the changes are neutral or may even inure to
stakeholders’ benefit. As noted above, occasionally interventions lead to cuts
in executive compensation. 221 The savings make money available to the rest
of the company. This does not hurt stakeholders, and it could, at least in
theory, lead to greater employee compensation. Generally speaking, though,
while stakeholders may sometimes benefit accidentally from activism, their
interests are not considered. As a result, they usually end up on the wrong
side of the equation.
Long-term shareholders might similarly suffer. If stock-prices were
efficient, this would be impossible. Rather, the moves would have to benefit
long-term holders; otherwise the stock price would remain steady or decline.
For example, layoffs would only lead to stock-price gains if the firm had too
many employees, not if the cuts were to muscle rather than fat. Along these
lines, proponents of hedge-fund activism rely on market efficiency to argue
that activism benefits all shareholders. 222 According to this logic, if returning
money to shareholders through buybacks or dividends increases the value of
target firms, it must mean management was holding too much capital;
companies that were told to cut staff and reduce R&D must have been
overspending in those areas; gains from mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”)
must come from synergy.
As discussed above, however, appeals to EMH are uncompelling. 223
There is good reason to believe stock prices largely reflect a short-term
valuation rather than an intrinsic value that accounts for cash flows stretching
to infinity. Further, the claims that activists increase the intrinsic value of
target firms strains credulity. Most importantly, activists typically target
strong performers. 224 They tend to be profitable and have steady cash
flows. 225 It seems odd that strong performers would have across-the-board
221. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
222. See Paul Singer, Efficient Markets Need Guys Like Me, WALL. ST. J. (Oct. 19, 2017),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/efficient-markets-need-guys-like-me-1508454427.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 85–99.
224. See Brav et al., supra note 201, at 1753 (“[T]arget firms tend to be low growth firms, but
are significantly more profitable.”); Coffee & Palia, supra note 31, at 582 (“In general, we observe
that target firms are often more profitable than the control sample, suggesting that these targets are
not poorly performing firms as some advocates for hedge fund activism suggest.”).
225. See Dennis K. Berman, A Radical Idea for Activist Investors: What if the Goal Were More
Investment with an Eye on the Long Term?, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 27, 2015),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-radical-idea-for-activist-investors-1422370260 (“The vast majority
[of hedge funds] are making similar demands of their targets, delivered with what now feels like a
dull percussion: Raise the dividend, buy back shares, cut these costs, spin off that division, sell the
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blind spots for the areas that hedge funds target—areas that happen to deliver
quick stock-price boosts. Rather, what looks to be happening is that activists
have identified a set of easily implementable ways to increase stock prices
given the short-term nature of stock valuations, and then search for
companies where the changes would generate the greatest return. Their
approach is formulaic, not bespoke. 226
Activists are generally not examining companies for ways to improve
intrinsic value. If this were the case, then interventions would be sui
generous. Hedge funds, for example, look to cut (rather than increase)
staff 227 and R&D. 228 If the funds were focused on intrinsic value, there
should be campaigns that argue for more staff and more R&D. Also, how do
hedge fund managers know how much companies should be spending in
these areas? They are financial professionals, not experts in target
businesses. 229 More likely, they are looking to make cuts to firm workforces
and R&D to quickly boost net earnings—a change with an immediate stockprice impact. 230
Similarly, if activists were long-term oriented, we would see
interventions that aim to improve long-term operational performance. They
might recommend heavy investments in R&D and in generating a loyal
workforce. They might push companies to build community ties or to cut
prices to develop consumer loyalty. They might even push for a shift in
strategy. But this is not what hedge funds usually propose. 231 Their proposals
generally have no relationship to long-term value, only to inputs in shortterm financial models. 232
The nature of activist interventions actually reinforces the inefficiency
narrative. If stock prices reflect short-term valuations, then moves that would
increase the long-term value of the firm would not be captured in current
stock prices. They could even lead to stock price declines. That hedge funds
company.”); Brav et al., supra note 201, at 1753; Coffee & Palia, supra note 31, at 582; Strine,
supra note 31, at 1890–91.
226. See Strine, supra note 31, at 1899, 1939–40.
227. See Coffee & Palia, supra note 31, at 589.
228. See id. at 576.
229. See id. at 592 (“In particular, there is reason to doubt that activist hedge funds bring much
specialized organizational knowledge or expertise to their engagements with target firms.”). There
are famous examples of hedge-fund-initiated operational changes that have gone poorly. See Strine,
supra note 31, at 1953 (discussing failures at J.C. Penney and Sears).
230. See Rappaport, supra note 93, at 65.
231. See Allaire, supra note 197, at 42 (hedge fund “recipes are shop-worn and predictable, and
(almost) never include any growth initiatives”); Berman, supra note 225 (“Consider the database
kept by FactSet, which has tracked 3,774 activist campaigns since 2005, and has placed each in one
of five categories. There is no such category for ‘advocating more long-term investment,’ says
FactSet vice president John Laide. ‘It’s an extremely rare demand, so we don’t code for it.’”).
232. See Berman, supra note 225. There are exceptions. See Strine, supra note 31, at 1908–09
(using Trian Fund Management as an example of activists that constructively engage with
management and invest for the longer term).
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are opting for a short-term agenda suggests that they lack faith that the market
rewards true value creation.
Their short-term agenda may actually hurt long-term investors. If stock
prices reflect short-term valuations, it is possible for hedge funds to increase
stock prices while decreasing long-term value, in the process transferring
wealth from long-term shareholders. It is easy to see how this might be the
case. Giving money back to shareholders might increase stock prices because
of the wealth transfer from creditors. But it might hurt long-term holders
because it leaves the company less resilient to shocks. Cuts to R&D increase
short-term profits but make the firm less competitive in the long-term. 233
Layoffs may also hurt. Net earnings may improve. Remaining employees
may even work harder for a time for fear of losing their jobs. But then
overworked employees leave, and the firm must incur the large expenses
associated with recruitment and training. If stock prices mainly reflect
expectations for the near future, then the long-term consequences would be
underpriced. The price change would be driven primarily by the goosed
financial statements, even if they are bound to regress in the future.
In sum, it is clear that activists engineer gains in stock prices. It is also
clear that there are wealth transfers from stakeholders. The degree to which
stock price gains come from the wealth transfers themselves (and the
improved financial statements that result) or from increases to the intrinsic
value of target firms is inextricably linked with the question of market
efficiency. If markets are efficient, the interventions must be creating real
value; if markets are inefficient, then the stock price gains reflect increases
in short-term values potentially at the expense of long-term shareholders.
Much evidence suggests that stock prices are inefficient. 234 The nature of
hedge fund interventions also suggests that activists are leveraging
inefficiency to create stock price moves rather than lasting value. Therefore,
while the effect on long-term shareholders cannot be known with absolute
certainty, it is highly likely that they do not benefit from activism and are in
fact harmed by it. 235

233. “A recent study assessing growth among the 500 largest companies in the world found that
investors realize outsized rewards when their companies invest aggressively in R&D and lose value
when R&D spending is low.” Neera Tanden and Blair Effron, How to Foster Long-Term Innovation
FOR
AM.
PROGRESS
(June
30,
2015),
Investment,
CTR.
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2015/06/30/116294/how-to-fosterlong-term-innovation-investment/.
234. See supra notes 89–97 and accompanying text.
235. Some argue that institutional support shows that hedge fund activism is beneficial to longterm shareholders. See Charles Nathan, Seven Deadly Fallacies of Activist Investing’s Critics,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 29, 2016),
http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/06/29/criticism-of-activist-investing. But actively managed
funds dictate the voting at large mutual-fund complexes. These funds share the hedge fund’s shortterm agenda. See Strine, supra note 31, at 1923.
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Regardless, hedge funds aim for purely stock-price gains. There is no
reason to think they care about stakeholders, and, other than blind appeals to
efficient markets, there is no case that hedge-fund-driven financial
engineering maximizes long-term value—the form of shareholder primacy
embraced by commentators and Delaware law.
F. The Market Shadow of Hedge Fund Activism
It is not only targets that act in line with the activists’ agenda. The idea
of de facto shareholder primacy is that all firms, not only those that have
come under attack, are forced to adopt the hedge fund ethos. No public
companies are immune from activism. Activists target hundreds of
companies a year.236 They target firms big and small. 237 Apple, 238
Microsoft, 239 and Procter & Gamble 240 have all been engaged by activists.
And these funds have a lot of resources. At last count, they have $130 billion
in assets under management. 241
Since every firm is a potential target, and since activist interventions are
so disruptive, 242 management has a significant incentive to take actions to
deflect their attention. The best way to do this is to preemptively adopt
measures activists would push, and more generally, to work to maximize

236. See WSJ-FactSet Activism Scorecard (Historical Data), WALL ST. J.,
http://graphics.wsj.com/activism-scorecard/ (last updated Oct. 27, 2016).
237. See Coffee & Palia, supra note 31, at 554 (“Historically, hedge fund activism focused on
smaller cap companies because it was too costly to assemble a sizeable stake in a larger cap
company. But this has changed. In 2013, for the first time, almost one third of activist campaigns
focused on companies with a market capitalization of over $2 billion.”).
238. See John Carney, Welcome to the Golden Age of Activist Investors, CNBC (Aug. 14, 2013),
https://www.cnbc.com/id/100963166; William Lazonick et al., Carl Icahn’s $2 Billion Apple Stake
Was a Prime Example of Investment Inequality, MARKETWATCH (June 7, 2016),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/carl-icahns-2-billion-apple-stake-was-a-prime-example-ofinvestment-inequality-2016-06-07.
239. See Carney, supra note 238.
240. See Lauren Debter, P&G Targeted by Billionaire Nelson Peltz in Biggest Proxy Fight in
History, FORBES (Jul. 17, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurengensler/2017/07/17/proctergamble-proxy-fight-nelson-peltz-trian-fund-management/#1935b4634162.
241. Vipal Monga et al., As Activism Rises, U.S. Firms Spend More on Buybacks than Factories,
WALL ST. J. (May 26, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/companies-send-more-cash-back-toshareholders-1432693805.
242. The median cost of a proxy fight in 2017 was $750,000. Mike Coronato, 2017 Proxy
Fights: High Cost, Low Volume, FACTSET (Nov. 6, 2017), https://insight.factset.com/2017-proxyfights-high-cost-low-volume. The proxy fight at Proctor & Gamble, the most expensive in history,
cost $60 million. Id. Companies frequently complain about the diversion of time and resources
related to activist engagements. See, e.g., Sheelah Kolhatkar, Paul Singer, Doomsday Investor,
NEW YORKER (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/08/27/paul-singerdoomsday-investor (“Gradually, Bush diverted his attention from running Athena to focus on
repelling, or appeasing, the hedge fund.”); Amie Tsang, Sina Doubles Down to Ward Off Activists
TIMES
(Nov.
7,
2017),
After
Proxy
Fight,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/07/business/dealbook/sina-proxy-activists.html.
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current share prices. 243 And this is what corporations are doing. It is
increasingly common for companies to engage in hedge fund favorites like
stock buybacks, 244 M&A transactions, 245 and spinoffs 246 even without an
activists’ prodding. They are also spending less on R&D. 247 Capital
investment is at “historic lows.” 248 The credible threat of activism is
fundamentally reshaping the agenda of public companies.
This is not to say that the forces of de facto shareholder primacy operate
equally on all companies. Firms may have traits that give them more space
to pursue long-term value or stakeholder goals. For instance, firms with
broader retail investor ownership, and less of an institutional base, are harder
for activists to target. 249 Since hedge funds tend to engage stronger
companies, 250 weaker companies, somewhat paradoxically, also have some
slack. Finally, firms may give public shareholders, including institutional
investors, diluted voting rights or none at all. 251 The unequal voting rights
reduce the power of activists, or in the latter case, disempower them.
Although this mode of disempowerment has gained headlines, only ten
percent of companies reduce public shareholder voting rights, 252 and so far,
243. See Coffee & Palia, supra note 31, at 580 (discussing pressure on firms to “take preemptive
steps to cut research expenditures”); Peter Cohan, The Activist Imperative: How CEOs Can Preempt
(Feb.
20,
2015),
Shareholder
Activists,
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/petercohan/2015/02/20/the-activist-imperative-how-ceos-canpreempt-shareholder-activists/#7280c0f6204a; Kolhatkar, supra note 242 (“Bush had repeatedly
been told that the best defense against an activist hedge fund was to get Athena’s stock price up.”).
244. See Monga et al., supra note 241; Michael Wursthorn, Stock Buybacks Are Booming, but
Share Prices Aren’t Budging, WALL ST. J. (July 8, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/stockbuybacks-are-booming-but-share-prices-arent-budging-1531054801.
245. See Emily Liner, What’s Behind the All-Time High in M&A?, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 16, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/03/16/whatsbehind-the-all-time-high-in-ma/.
246. See Antonella Ciancio, M&A Boom Fuels Spin-Offs, GLOBAL FIN. (Feb. 7, 2018),
https://www.gfmag.com/magazine/february-2018/bull-market-adds-fuel-spin-offs;
Steven
Davidoff Solomon, Remaking Dow and DuPont for the Activist Shareholders, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
15, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/16/business/dealbook/remaking-dow-and-dupontfor-the-activist-shareholders.html?_r=0.
247. See Anne Marie Knott, The Trillion-Dollar R&D Fix, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 2012),
https://hbr.org/2012/05/the-trillion-dollar-rd-fix; Alana Semuels, Can America’s Companies
Survive America’s Most Aggressive Investors?, ATLANTIC (Nov. 18, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/11/activist-investors/506330/.
248. Dominic Barton et al., Finally, Evidence That Managing for the Long Term Pays Off,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 7, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/02/finally-proof-that-managing-for-the-longterm-pays-off.
249. See Simi Kedia et al., Institutional Investors and Hedge Fund Activism 4 (Nov. 2016)
(unpublished manuscript), https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name
=AFA2018&paper_id=342 (finding institutional ownership increases likelihood of being targeted
by activists).
250. See supra notes 224–225 and accompanying text.
251. See Dual-Class Stock, COUNCIL INSTITUTIONAL INV., https://www.cii.org/dualclass_stock
(last visited Feb. 15, 2019).
252. See id.
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only one company—Snap—has disenfranchised them completely. 253 More
generally, there is a transaction cost boundary on activist activities. Certain
corporate practices might not affect share price enough, or in a certain enough
way, to be worth a fight. 254
The limits to de facto shareholder primacy trace the limits of investor
protection. As noted earlier, nobody believes that retail investors actually
read the disclosures that securities law demands. Instead, the theory is that
transparency protects investors indirectly, because everyone trades at a price
informed by sophisticated trading. 255 The strength of this protection varies
with the degree of institutional interest. Less institutional involvement
weakens both de facto shareholder primacy and investor protection. Their
heavy presence, however, means that both are powerful forces in the
securities markets.
Empirical work supports the link between hedge-fund activism and
corporate purpose. In a forthcoming paper, Professors Gartenberg and
Serafeim measure corporate purpose, defined as “a concrete goal or objective
for the firm that reaches beyond profit maximization.” 256 They find that
public companies have a lower corporate purpose than private ones 257 and
that, among public firms, those with high levels of hedge-fund ownership
have a “substantially lower” corporate purpose. 258 Their work also suggests
that corporate purpose declines after hedge funds purchase their shares,
implying causation. 259 These findings directly align with the thesis that
hedge-fund activism is pushing public firms toward shareholder primacy.
G. Why De Facto Shareholder Primacy Is Different
Hedge fund activism is not the only thing pushing executives to
maximize stock prices. But the pressure hedge funds exert is unique. When
253. See id.
254. The transaction-cost boundary may explain why, for instance, an increasing number of
firms are adopting so-called Environmental, Social, and Governance (“ESG”) reporting even in the
era of hedge-fund activism. See SOL KWON, INV’R RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CTR. INST., STATE
OF SUSTAINABILITY AND INTEGRATED REPORTING 2018 3 (2018) (finding that seventy-eight
percent of S&P 500 companies issue a sustainability report in some form). These might help
stakeholders, even at the expense of shareholders, but the harm to the stock price may not be large
enough to warrant reprisal. It is also possible that these are actually good for shareholder value,
because consumers like to purchase from companies that appear to care about the environment.
Finally, the impact of ESG reports may be negligible or indeterminate. See generally Jill E. Fisch,
Making Sustainability Disclosure Sustainable, 107 GEO. L.J. 923 (2019) (critiquing the current state
of sustainability reporting and suggesting reform).
255. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
256. Claudine Gartenberg & George Serafeim, Corporate Purpose and Firm Ownership 3 (Aug.
20, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=344028
1.
257. Id. at 30.
258. Id. at 27.
259. See id. at 29.
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confronted by activists, boards and executives face the credible threat of
removal if they fail to abide. 260 In other cases, leadership has far greater
discretion about how much value to put on share price.
As noted above, many institutional investors have a short-term focus. 261
Mutual funds are measured each quarter, and active managers might sell if a
company fails to deliver anticipated returns. 262 Such a turn in sentiments
might trigger a stock-price drop, which might cause the board to fire the CEO.
Alternatively, if the board does nothing, a competitor or private equity firm
might launch a hostile takeover. Like hedge fund activism, fear of
termination or fear of acquisition should incentivize share-price
maximization.
The comparison to activism, however, is superficial. Boards might or
might not choose to fire their CEO for an underperforming stock price. The
decision is up to the directors, which they are free to make in conformity with
the company’s chosen corporate purpose. A board might very well decide
that current stock prices do not reflect the true value of the CEO or the
company, in which case they might choose a wait-and-see approach. The
board retains discretion over its corporate purpose, and its decision on
whether to retain the CEO is a function of that choice.
If the stock price sinks too low, this raises the possibility of a hostile
acquisition. In this case, the board and the CEO could be replaced. These
are not the threat they seem, however. Boards can defeat hostile takeovers
with poison pills. 263 While fewer and fewer companies have poison pill plans
in place, companies can choose to implement them as soon as they come
under attack. 264 These plans make a hostile acquisition nearly impossible,
and under Delaware law, boards have wide discretion around them. 265 The
deference that courts afford not only undermines this mechanism for tying
management to stock price; it is also another indication of the corporatepurpose flexibility corporate law provides.

260. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text.
262. See Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37
J. CORP. L. 265, 296–297, 304 (2012); Rappaport, supra note 93, at 66, 77 n.2.
263. See Macey, supra note 148, at 31–32 (describing poison pills).
264. See Jessica Hall, Poison Pills Drop to Lowest Level in 20 Years, REUTERS (Mar. 30, 2010),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-dealtalk-poisonpills/poison-pills-drop-to-lowest-level-in-20years-idUSTRE62T5D320100330. Because activists purchase relatively small stakes in private
firms, and assemble in “wolf packs,” poison pills are ineffective against them. See Coffee & Palia,
supra note 31, at 603–04; Gardner Davis, Sotheby’s Poison Pill Battle Reshapes World of
Shareholder Activism, AM. B. ASS’N: BUS. L. TODAY (Sept. 19, 2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2014/06/keeping_current_davi
s/.
265. See Macey, supra note 148, at 34–36; see also Zingales, supra note 169, at 399 (“State
antitakeover statutes and poison pills have made hostile takeovers all but impossible.”).
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Commentators have also argued that executive compensation pushes
executives to maximize stock prices. 266 This is because they are paid with
equity, either in the form of stock grants or stock options. Indeed, these
compensation schemes were introduced to focus management’s attention on
stock prices. 267 Executive compensation plans, however, often do not reward
immediate gains. Options and stock grants vest over time. 268 The vesting
schedule may even cause executives to focus on the longer term. More
importantly, executive compensation is different because it is set by the
board. The board chooses whether it wants to incentivize its officers in this
way, whether doing so aligns with their corporate purpose. A compensation
scheme that emphasizes share prices is by choice rather than de facto fiat
through the threat of activism. 269
Finally, the existence of activism itself is proof that these mechanisms
do not fully align corporate activities and shareholder primacy. The existence
of the arbitrage opportunities that draw in activists shows that companies are
not currently doing all that they can to maximize share prices.
H. Hedge-Fund Activism as a Mechanism of De Facto Shareholder
Primacy
Hedge-fund activism is discussed and debated as if it was as a standalone phenomenon. But the institutional context is crucially important for a
full understanding of how it should be viewed and whether it should be
constrained. What has been so far ignored in the debate is that the securities
laws are necessary for activism and that activists are mechanisms of
shareholder primacy in the same way that sophisticated institutional investors
are mechanisms of investor protection.
If not for the trustworthy comprehensive disclosures public companies
are forced to make available to everyone, activist hedge funds would lack the
information to make policy proposals in the first place. The corporate
financial statements contained in the mandated disclosures are the building
blocks of financial analysis, and without access to them, hedge funds would
have no basis on which to intervene. 270 The transparency provided by the
securities laws is the ground on which hedge fund activism is built. 271

266. See Rock, supra note 55, at 1911.
267. See Coffee & Palia, supra note 31, at 593–94; Rock, supra note 55, at 1917.
268. Coffee & Palia, supra note 31, at 593–94.
269. In a sense, de facto shareholder primacy is also a choice because public companies choose
to go public and subject themselves to it. The argument stands, however, that the securities laws
force this choice and squeeze out companies that would prefer a different corporate purpose.
270. See Park, supra note 194 (surveying the metrics activists use).
271. This is not to suggest that the information the securities laws provide is the only data that
hedge funds rely on. Securities disclosures may provide only the starting point for copious
additional research.

690

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 79:652

The crucial role of the securities laws is apparent when the public
markets are contrasted with the private ones. In the private markets, there is
no disclosure requirement. And companies do not share information with the
public. 272 Rather, they share it only in privately negotiated transactions with
investors they would welcome as shareholders. 273 As a result, hedge-fund
activism is nonexistent. Entrepreneurs choose a corporate purpose that suits
them, and investors who find it agreeable become shareholders. 274
It is only when companies go public, and are required to make their
finances available to everyone, that they are forced to adopt shareholder
primacy. Activism is the mechanism through which the securities laws
translate to a de facto corporate purpose mandate. This theory—that hedgefund activists are mechanisms of de facto shareholder primacy—has the same
structure as the predominate theory about how the securities laws protect
investors. Each is about how the securities laws, through institutional
intermediation, impact the securities market. The conventional story is that
institutions read disclosures to inform their trading, which protects investors
as their diligence translates into prices. 275 In de facto shareholder primacy,
institutions, namely activist hedge funds, also rely on the securities
disclosures. But they use it to identify suitable targets for intervention. The
market pressure translates to homogeneity of corporate purpose.
Viewing hedge-fund activists as regulatory intermediaries is useful for
three reasons. First, it highlights the crucial role that the securities laws play
in dictating corporate purpose, something that has gone unrecognized. As
noted above, while corporate law theoretically embraces shareholder
primacy, it does not do so in practice, because, most of all, the business
judgment rule is so deferential. 276 In contrast, the securities laws are
theoretically about investor protection. In practice, however, the securities
laws have become the primary regulatory apparatus driving shareholder
primacy. Despite the enormous amount of attention that corporate purpose
has received from corporate law scholars, it is actually securities law that now
demands it.
More broadly, the relationship of the securities laws to corporate
purpose shows that these laws are much more closely connected to corporate

272. See PITCHBOOK, VENTURE’S LIQUIDITY RELEASE VALVE 3 (2017) (noting the “opacity
and scarcity of information” in the private market).
273. See id. at 3–5.
274. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 79, at 17. Liquidity is also important for de
facto shareholder primacy. Activists need to be able to purchase and resell shares easily and without
interference from the target. The securities laws kill liquidity in the private market and provide the
informational richness that it requires in the public market. See Jeff Schwartz, The Twilight of
Equity Liquidity, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 531, 550–63 (2012) (discussing private-market liquidity and
the hurdles the securities laws pose).
275. See supra notes 161–162 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 120–122 and accompanying text.
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law than previously understood. The aspects of the securities laws that
dictate corporate governance, like those requiring that public companies have
majority independent boards and fully independent audit and compensation
committees, have been recognized as pushing into corporate law’s territory.
These rules are sometimes even referred to as federal corporate law. 277 What
scholars have failed to recognize is that all of securities law impacts corporate
governance. Although corporate leadership is inherently better informed,
securities-law disclosures close much of the information gap between
shareholders and management that exists under corporate law. 278 The
securities laws thus empower public shareholders at the expense of insiders.
Collective action problems meant that this power long went unused, but the
institutionalization of the securities markets has greatly reduced this
barrier. 279 Today, securities law fundamentally alters the nature of public
firms—complementing, and as I argue further below, supplanting key aspects
of corporate law. 280
Finally, recognizing the role of securities law reframes the debate about
hedge-fund activism. As I flesh out in Part III, it transforms the debate into
one over the proper scope of the securities laws rather than over whether
market actors engaged in a disruptive and innovative new practice should be
constrained. Similarly, because hedge-fund activists transform the securities
laws into a de facto shareholder primacy regime, a critique of de facto
shareholder primacy is also a critique of hedge-fund activism. The debate
about activism today focuses on implications for shareholder welfare at target
firms. 281 Linking hedge-fund activism to the securities laws and to the advent
of de facto shareholder primacy provides a much broader perspective on the
implications of their activities.
I. Critique of De Facto Shareholder Primacy
De facto shareholder primacy forces public companies to maximize
share price regardless of the preferences of the board, management, or the
principles on which the corporation was founded. This outcome contravenes
core tenets of corporate and securities law and the federalist principles that
divide them. In doing so, it hurts entrepreneurs and investors, and weakens
securities markets.
De facto shareholder primacy unravels the structure of corporate law.
Corporate law is enabling. It sets default rules, but leaves the outline of the

277. See Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and Delaware’s Stake,
34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 91 (2009).
278. See supra Section II.B.
279. See supra Section II.C.
280. See text accompanying notes infra 282–285.
281. See Coffee & Palia, supra note 31, at 548 (summarizing debate over hedge-fund activism).
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corporate structure—including corporate purpose—to private ordering. 282
When they incorporate, founders can choose whatever lawful purpose they
wish. 283 If, as is commonly the case, a company incorporates in Delaware,
but leaves corporate purpose unspecified, then Delaware law nominally
requires that management maximize long-term shareholder value. The legal
standard for judging compliance is so deferential, however, that, in practice,
management has broad discretion to run the firm as it pleases. 284 The
securities laws eviscerate this flexibility.
Moreover, under corporate law, boards run corporations. Shareholders
have little power. The legal structure situates shareholders as passive owners
with little say over the firm’s business or purpose. 285 The securities laws
reverse this power structure. Boards are at the mercy of shareholders, and
the most influential have rallied behind the activist agenda. 286
Worse still, corporate law is implicitly about public corporations. The
legal structure it sets up is meant to function when there is a separation
between management and shareholders—the hallmark of public
companies. 287 Securities law thus eviscerates core features of corporate
law—its enabling stance toward corporate purpose and its insulation of the
board—in the exact area where it is targeted.
Securities law, and the transparency it affords, was never supposed to
upend corporate law. The law’s aim was to foster informed financial
transactions, not impact firm operations. 288 The famous securities-law
aphorism, “[s]unlight is . . . the best . . . disinfectant[],” suggests that the
requirement to disclose should lead to more ethical behavior. 289 And this was
likely part of the motivation for the securities laws, but disclosure is not
meant to alter the fundamentals of corporate operations or purpose. 290 In
response to the rules, firms are expected to disclose material aspects of their
businesses, not change what they do or why they do it. That the securities
laws bring de facto shareholder primacy thus contravenes foundational
aspects not only of corporate law, but also of securities law.

282. See supra Section I.E.
283. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(1) (2017).
284. See supra Section I.E.
285. See supra Section I.E.
286. See supra notes 199–200 and accompanying text.
287. See Bainbridge, supra note 106, at 568.
288. See Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences
for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 418 (2003).
289. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914).
290. See S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 10 (1934) (“The principal objection directed against the
provisions for corporate reporting [in the securities laws] is that they constitute a veiled attempt to
invest a governmental commission with the power to interfere in the management of corporations.
The committee has no such intention, and feels that the bill furnishes no justification for such an
interpretation.”).

2020]

DE FACTO SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY

693

Principles of federalism go by the wayside as well. By federally
imposing a corporate purpose, the securities laws deprive the states of their
longstanding jurisdiction over the matter. 291 Stepping past that boundary is
particularly problematic when it comes to corporate purpose.
Generally speaking, federalist principles dictate that federal law should
govern when uniformity is desired. 292 In general, federal securities regulation
makes sense because it is a nightmare for companies to comply with fifty
different state securities law regimes. 293 If, however, it would be better to
allow states to serve as laboratories of experimentation, then the matter
should be left to the states to allow for competition and innovation. 294
Corporate purpose fits squarely in the latter category. This is an area
where there is currently a great deal of innovation. The widespread adoption
of benefit corporation statutes is one example. The first was in Maryland in
2010, 295 and the form of doing business is now available in thirty-six states. 296
There also does not appear to be any harm to leaving this to state courts and
legislatures. Sometimes, for example, uniformity is desired because there is
a concern with a race to the bottom. 297 But that is not an issue here. The
boundaries of corporate purpose are perfect for the state level trial-and-error
process of legal development.
Rather than allow for experimentation, the securities laws have
unintentionally created corporate-purpose clones. This result weakens
securities markets, and harms both entrepreneurs and investors. Securities
markets are diminished when firms have the same corporate purpose. In
particular, if a firm focuses only on stock price, it might lead to riskier
behavior, which jeopardizes its long-term prospects. Stock buybacks, for
example, reduce a firm’s capital cushion, making it more susceptible to
shocks. The securities laws provide an overwhelming incentive to take this
risk. De facto shareholder primacy deprives the market of diversity of
corporate purpose, diversity that would provide a cushion if firms devoted to

291. See Buxbaum, supra note 110, at 32.
292. See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 318–19 (1851) (explaining that the
need for uniformity is a central test for federal preemption).
293. See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The SEC’s Regulation A+: Small Business Goes Under
the Bus Again, 104 KY. L.J. 325, 327 (2016).
294. The classic statement comes from Justice Brandeis. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,
285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
295. First Benefit Corporation Goes Public–Laureate Education, CORP. SOC. RESP. NEWSWIRE
(Feb. 13, 2017), http://www.csrwire.com/press_releases/39700-First-Benefit-Corporation-GoesPublic-Laureate-Education.
CORP.,
296. State
by
State
Status
of
Legislation,
BENEFIT
http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
297. See Edward J. Janger, Predicting When the Uniform Law Process Will Fail, 83 IOWA L.
REV. 569, 579 (1998).
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share-price maximization stumble. The market—and the economy—is
therefore less resilient.
The rigidity is also bad for entrepreneurs. Unless they have the clout
and hutzpah to issue low-vote or no-vote shares to the public, founders who
wish to maximize stakeholder value or long-term shareholder value cannot
go public without sacrificing this purpose. There is no reason for regulation
to cut entrepreneurs off from this means of capital raising and deprive them
of the other benefits of going public. Indeed, there is much debate about why
the public markets have become less attractive. Many blame the monetary
costs of being a public company. 298 But perhaps this fundamental change
that happens when a company goes public is a bigger factor.299
Retail investors are the final victims. They may wish to back companies
that have a stakeholder focus or care about long-term value. These firms
exist in the private market. 300 But private firms may only sell stock to
institutions and accredited investors. 301 Retail investors can only invest in
public firms, but these must adhere to de facto shareholder primacy. This is
particularly problematic for the many mutual-fund investors who put money
in these instruments to fund their retirement. De facto shareholder primacy
might lead to a short-term boost in their returns, but the long-term is
uncertain. They may even give aspiring retirees a false sense of security.
Although it is counterintuitive, the shift in power to shareholders is likely bad
for many shareholders.
The only sure beneficiaries of the returns bump that results when firms
take actions to boost stock prices are the hedge funds that lobby for them.
While their wealth is part of the social-welfare equation, the range of negative
consequences suggests that reform is appropriate.
III. A NEW LENS FOR HEDGE-FUND ACTIVISM
This Article has shown that the securities laws underpin hedge-fund
activism and therefore also underpin de facto shareholder primacy.
Recognizing the role of the securities laws is important to the debate on
activism because it shifts the perspective of the regulatory analysis and
allows for a more fulsome consideration of its societal costs. A
comprehensive weighing of the costs and benefits of hedge-fund activism

298. See Schwartz, supra note 274, at 544–48 (discussing the argument that costs have caused
the decline in IPOs).
299. Cf. Jamie Dimon & Warren E. Buffett, Short-Termism Is Harming the Economy, WALL
ST. J. (June 6, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/short-termism-is-harming-the-economy1528336801 (“Short-term-oriented capital markets have discouraged companies with a longer term
view from going public at all, depriving the economy of innovation and opportunity.”).
300. There are thousands of private B. Corps, including companies like Patagonia and Warby
Parker. See Chafkin & Cao, supra note 20.
301. See supra Section II.A.
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suggests that activists are a drag on social welfare and that securities-law
reform is, therefore, appropriate.
A. The Cost-Benefit Framework
The critical policy question raised by the critique of de facto shareholder
primacy is whether activist hedge funds should be constrained. The way to
approach this question is through cost-benefit analysis. This is the core
analytical framework for judging the probity of regulatory intervention, and
it is required of the SEC. 302 If hedge-fund activism is viewed as a free-market
innovation (rather than an unintended consequence of regulation), then
regulators would have to show that the costs of activism outweigh its benefits
before undertaking regulatory efforts.
The notion that hedge-fund activism is an independent phenomenon is
implicit in the current debate about activism, 303 as is its corollary, that a
showing of net harm is a precondition to regulation. 304 This Article shows
that these premises are incorrect. Rather, hedge-fund activism is a product
of the securities laws. Since the securities laws should not support activities
of questionable social value, activism itself must withstand cost-benefit
scrutiny. The burden should be on the hedge-fund industry, not regulators. 305
Another way to see why the burden should be on industry is to imagine
that regulators foresaw the potential for the securities laws to be used to
support activism and considered whether it would be good public policy for
them to be used in that way. The regulatory analysis would assess whether
the benefits of activism outweigh the costs. If not, the securities laws would
be drafted to avoid supporting it. That the securities laws only came to
support the activity well into their existence, mainly as a result of market
innovations rather than rule changes, 306 should not alter the policy analysis.
This is a common problem in economic regulation. Rules are static; markets
are dynamic. As markets change, regulations must be reassessed so that they
continue to provide a net benefit to society. Here, if the securities laws are

302. See Jeff Schwartz & Alexandrea Nelson, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Conflict Minerals
Rule, 68 ADMIN L. REV. 287, 295–96 (2016) (discussing the required use of cost-benefit analysis
in SEC rulemaking).
303. See, e.g., Gilson & Gordon, supra note 31, at 896–97 (framing hedge-fund activism as
arising in response to an arbitrage opportunity in corporate governance).
304. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 31, at 1667 (criticizing opponents of activism for lack of
empirical evidence of long-term consequences).
305. In areas like this, where there are competing theoretical claims and contested empirics,
which side bears the burden in regulatory analysis can be decisive. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond
the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1003 (2003) (discussing the precautionary
principle, which “imposes a burden of proof on those who create potential risks”).
306. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 875–889 (2013).
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supporting an activity that cannot be shown to improve social welfare, they
should be changed.
B. The Social-Welfare Calculus
Though hard numbers on the costs and benefits of activism are illusive,
on balance, hedge-fund activism is likely harmful for society. The real-world
harms to entrepreneurs, investors, and the economy that stem from de facto
shareholder primacy can be viewed as the costs of activism. 307 These must
be weighed against the benefit—the amount of wealth that activists create. 308
This figure is not equivalent to the increase in stock prices at target firms
and in firms that take similar actions as a way to ward off the activist threat.
Three discounts need to be applied to account for the possibility that much,
if not all, of the stock-price bump results from wealth transfers. 309
First, as noted above, much of the wealth creation owes to transfers from
stakeholders. 310 This is true regardless of whether stock prices reflect shortor long-term valuations. Laying off an employee, regardless of that
employee’s productivity, is a wealth transfer from the employee to
shareholders. All else being equal, stock prices will rise to reflect this
reallocation. But the transfer to shareholders only increases social welfare if
the money is more valuable in the company’s hands than the employees’.
The transfer itself creates no value. 311
Second, much of the gains from activism comes from M&A transactions
where the target firm is sold. 312 Typically in such transactions, a decrease in
the share price of the acquired firm accompanies the increase in stock price
at the target. 313 Thus, at least part of the M&A gains come from wealth
changing hands from shareholders of the acquiring firm to shareholders of
the target.
Finally, the stock-price increase might reverse over time. If prices
reflect only short-term valuations, then there is a good chance that the rise
reflects a transfer from long-term shareholders. As discussed above, the
nature of the hedge-fund interventions suggests that the changes they push,

307. See supra Section II.E.
308. This Article uses the total surplus approach to cost-benefit analysis, which seeks to measure
the welfare impact on society rather than certain parties. See Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, The Efficiency
Criterion for Securities Regulation: Investor Welfare or Total Surplus?, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 85, 103
(2015).
309. See John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation, 124 YALE L.J. 882,
933 (2015) (discussing how “[c]anonical economic theory” treats transfers).
310. See supra Part II.E.
311. See id.
312. See Allaire, supra note 197, at 34, 42; Strine, supra note 31, at 1944.
313. See William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 142425 (2007); Strine, supra note 31, at 1945–46.
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like cuts to R&D, fall into this category. 314 While it is impossible to know
just how much of the increase in stock prices is owed to transfers from
stakeholders, acquiring-firm shareholders, and long-term shareholders, there
is good reason to believe that they represent the bulk of the pop. 315
Whatever is left represents true value—an increase to shareholder
wealth after subtracting out transfers. This amount can be compared to the
manifold problems—from stymied entrepreneurs and investors to unstable
markets—that de facto shareholder primacy creates. While it is beyond the
scope of this Article—if feasible at all—to put hard numbers to this
weighing, 316 a qualitative balancing suggests that the benefits of activism do
not outweigh the widespread and significant costs. 317 This suggests reform.
C. Reforms to Eliminate Hedge-Fund Activism
This Article has shown that the securities laws unintentionally force
companies to adopt share-price maximization as their corporate purpose and
that this de facto shareholder primacy requirement is probably bad for social
welfare. The policy implication is, therefore, that reforms should be
considered to free companies from this weight. The way to unburden them
is to restrain hedge-fund activism. There is a way to end the practice that
builds on the existing structure of the securities laws.
Currently, investors are required to report their holdings and material
plans for the firm once they have acquired five percent of a target company’s
shares. 318 If this rule were changed to require reporting before any
acquisition with the intent to intervene in firm affairs, it would remove the
profits from activism. Because much of the stock-price bump from activism
occurs when the intervention is disclosed, 319 the activist gains would
evaporate. Deprived of the vast majority of their profits, there would be no
incentive to intervene. This is a simple change that could come directly from
the SEC. 320
The biggest counterargument to this proposal is that it goes too far. It
eliminates all of hedge-fund activism even though there is the potential that
some provides long-term benefits to shareholders. As noted above, however,
it is unlikely that this is a large loss. It is quite difficult and risky to make
314. See supra notes 232–233 and accompanying text.
315. See supra Section II.F.
316. See Coates, supra note 309, at 1011 (“Detailed case studies of six rules reveal that precise,
reliable, quantified CBA remains unfeasible.”).
317. Cf. id. at 886–87, 892–93 (arguing for conceptual cost-benefit analysis).
318. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l (2019), Form of Schedule 13d, 17
C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (2019).
319. See Coffee & Palia, supra note 31, at 551 & n.14.
320. See James D. Cox & Benjamin J.C. Baucom, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Confronting
the D.C. Circuit’s Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1811, 1818 (2012)
(discussing the SEC’s rulemaking authority).
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money from long-term bets, 321 and the evidence strongly suggests that
activists, by and large, are looking for a quick boost. 322
A related argument is that ridding the market of hedge-fund activists
would provide management with too much slack. 323 As a result, they would
be able to prioritize their own interests rather than that of the firm. This
argument is also unconvincing. First, it presumes that stock prices are an
accurate way to police slack. If management is looking to maximize
stakeholder interests, then stock price is only a partial metric. If management
is looking to maximize long-term value, then stock price is a deeply noisy
metric. Management may be looking out for long-term interests, which
might not be reflected in stock prices, or might even be punished. 324 Second,
even if stock price is an accurate measure of management performance,
corporate leadership has ample incentive already to focus on it. As noted
above, executives are commonly compensated with equity; 325 they also face
pressure from institutional investors worried about short-term
performance. 326 Finally, if there is truly a concern that management is not
responsive enough to share price, then this is an issue for corporate law. That
is where the balance between management and shareholders has always been
struck. 327 The overriding influence of securities law—an instrument of
investor protection—is an accident.
A final argument is that hedge-fund activism should be left to private
ordering. First, institutional investors might stop supporting them. Second,
companies can adopt dual-class share structures to choke off the activists’
influence. Despite promising rhetoric, the hope that institutional investors
will turn away is fanciful so long as they chase short-term returns. 328 And
dual class shares go too far. 329 Placing a regulatory constraint on activism
leaves in place every other form of shareholder engagement, while dual-class
shares eviscerate them all.

321. See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 224–232 and accompanying text.
323. See Bebchuk, supra note 31, at 1679.
324. See supra notes 89–99 and accompanying text.
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327. See Strine, supra note 94, at 9.
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Investors on Activism, 32 REV. FIN. STUD. 2720, 2723 (2019); Jill Fisch et al., The New Titans of
Wall Street: A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors, 168 U. PENN. L. REV. 17, 52–53
(2019); Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. 493, 520–
523 (2018).
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If hedge-fund activism were curbed through the recommended
disclosures, then there would be no mechanism for de facto shareholder
primacy. Although firms might still choose to focus their efforts on shareprice maximization, it would not automatically follow from going public.
Firms would have the ability to change and adapt, and to incorporate and be
more receptive to a broader range of interests. The benefits of this restored
flexibility would flow through to securities markets, securities-market
participants, and to the economy.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article introduces the concept of corporate purpose to securities
law. In doing so, it shows that the legal regime unintentionally compels firms
to maximize share price regardless of the implications for long-term
shareholders, let alone stakeholders. This world of de facto shareholder
primacy hurts investors, entrepreneurs, and the overall economy.
Hedge-fund activism is the mechanism of de facto shareholder primacy.
Based on the insights they glean from the required disclosures, hedge funds
demand share-price maximizing actions of target management. Fear of proxy
contests drives targets to consent; fear of activist intervention leads all firms
to act like they are already targets.
The way to disentangle the securities laws from corporate purpose is to
curb hedge-fund activism. The way to curb hedge-fund activism is to require
that funds announce their planned acquisitions and interventions before
purchasing target securities. Demanding that hedge funds disclose so early
would eliminate the profit potential from engagement, thus ending the
practice. An end to hedge-fund activism, and the concomitant end to de facto
shareholder primacy, would give firms the freedom to pursue other corporate
purposes. Given the crucial role of corporations in society, this flexibility
would have far-reaching benefits.

